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INTRODUCTION

According to A. Irving Hallowell, the key to the professionaliza
tion of anthropology is the development of a "comprehensive spatio-tem
poral frame of reference which embraces all living varieties of Homo
sapiens, as well as extinct cultures and peoples of the distant past and
more ancient hominid types besides" (1965:308).

The purpose of this

thesis is to trace the development of this framework through conditions
giving rise to an increased awareness of world geography, the concomitant
necessity of explaining diversity, and to the acceptance of the theory
of evolution by natural selection.

Before these investigations can be

undertaken, however, it is important to delineate Hallowell’s notions
of anthropology, the process of professionalization, and the spatio-tem
poral framework regarded as necessary to this process.
Hallowell primarily focuses upon anthropological questions and their
refinement within a professional discipline.

He suggests that systematic

inquiry which characterizes anthropology developed from a more general
ized interest in humanity evident in all cultures.

The most authorita

tive answers to such questions in non-Western cultures and prior to or
ganized inquiry in Western civilization are felt to be "embedded in the
cognitive orientation of a people, in their culturally constituted world
view, from which they have not been abstracted and articulated" (Hallowell
1965:305).

This type of knowledge Hallowell labels as folk anthropology.

In Western culture folk anthropology has been equated with the tra
ditional Christian world view which amounts to "culturally constituted,

1
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untested knowledge about man and his world, reinforced by socially sanc
tioned religious values which gave it the stamp of ultimate truth" (Hal
lowell 1965:307).

In contrast, professional anthropology is characterized

by specialists in the study of man who are concerned with undertaking
systematic observations and inquiry and who aspire to values of reli
ability in knowledge of all aspects of human phenomena.
outstanding in this definition:

Two terms are

systematic and reliability.

The former

suggests a preconceived methodological approach and the latter implies
a dependability leading toward predictability.

Both concepts lend legit

imation to anthropology of a more empirical nature.
"Professional" is the adjectival form of a noun meaning "a vocation
or occupation requiring advanced education and training, and involving
intellectual skills" (Webster's New World Dictionary of the American
Language 1970definition 3).

It follows that if anthropology is to be

considered professional, it must be an established discipline within
an institution of advanced education.

Anthropology achieved this status

in 1884 when Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917) was appointed Reader of
Anthropology at Oxford University.

Since professional anthropology is

unique in its origin to Western culture and given Hallowell’s definition
of folk anthropology, the traditional Christian world view must be ac
knowledged as the foundation from which anthropology professionalized.
The process in question, the transition from folk to professional anthro
pology, may be viewed in terms of legitimation.

Sanction in the former

is of a religious nature, specifically, Christian.
pology is legitimated by empirical science.

Professional anthro

To understand the process

of transition, one must investigate the conditions which mitigated in
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favor of a scientific world view.
The spatio-temporal framework conceived by Hallowell obviously in
volves the development of two discrete conceptualizations which together
are required for the professionalization of anthropology.

In the spatial

realm, one observes a change from a perspective limited to the immediate
European, Asian, and African land masses and their associated peoples to
an awareness of world geography and a vast diversity of peoples.

The

ramifications of this dramatic expansion of perspective in Western thought
had profound effects on ideology which will be revealed as this paper
develops.

Anthropology emerged as the discipline destined to analyze

and synthesize the rapidly accumulating information in a holistic, com
parative manner.
Traditionally in Western civilization, time was viewed in a cyclical
sense— a conceptualization typical of most cultures.

Yet, anthropology

professionalized in a civilization whose time concept was linear.

For

a linear time concept to emerge, it was necessary to transcend cyclical
Christian notions of world chronology.

The process was begun by James

Hutton (1726-1797) who claimed the geological age of the earth to be
much longer than that attributed to it by Biblical account.

Linear time

was confirmed by Charles Darwin (1809-1882) when he demonstrated evolu
tion by the mechanism of natural selection.

The concomitant Darwinian

refutation of the immutability of species functioned to significantly
undermine the religiously sanctioned world view.
Given these definitions and directions, the following study attempts
to present the conditions of change in the intellectual environment of
Western civilization which result in the unique transition from folk
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to professional anthropology.
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MIDDLE AGES/RENAISSANCE: FROM THE AGE OF FAITH
TO THE AGE OF DISCOVERY AND THE SEARCH FOR ORIGINS

As one might expect when considering change in the intellectual
environment through history, there is no simple line of demarcation be
tween any two attitudes.

Such is the case with the impact of geographic

discoveries on the European world view.

The process of attitude change

from the circumscribed perspective of the Middle Ages to the broad aware
ness of the nineteenth century was gradual, involving the contributions
of many people and the breaking down of a well-established traditional
belief structure.
"It is no exaggeration that the progress of geographical discovery
and exploration, with the simultaneous broadening of the intellectual
horizon, forms one of the most important manifestations of the Renais
sance" (Thompson

1959:7 ).- This statement pinpoints the intellectual

atmosphere associated with the beginning of the Age of Discovery^".

The

Middle Ages-Renaissance periods are not clearly distinguished in time.
The Middle Ages is generally regarded as covering the span from the fall
of the Roman Empire in 476 A.D. to the mid-fifteenth century.

The Renais

sance is generally correlated with the fourteenth, fifteenth, and six
teenth centuries.

A century and a half overlap is indicative of the

lengthy transitional element involved in ideological change viewed at the
cultural level.

That the Age of Discovery (beginning ca. 1450 A.D.) is

an outgrowth of the Renaissance intellectual atmosphere rather than that
of the Middle Ages reflects the Renaissance interest in the world around
humans as opposed to the medieval preoccupation with heaven and hell—
the Age of Faith (Thompson 1959:6).

Prior to discussing the Renaissance

5
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intellectual environment, it would be of value to consider the medieval
world view which co-existed with the early Renaissance.
The Middle Ages is generally characterized by intellectual stagna
tion (particularly the early part commonly referred to as the Dark Ages),
thought being dominated by the values of the Roman Catholic Church.
Medieval awareness of other lands and peoples was limited to the writings
of the Encyclopedists.
tales of monstrosities.

These accounts of other nations were filled with
Typical of this literary genre was the work of

the Bishop of Seville, Isodore.

His Etymologies (622-623) reduced ethno

logical description to epithets which through time were sanctioned by
traditional usage.

Etymologies was regarded as the authority on other

peoples until the thirteenth century when Bartholomaeus Anglicus (Bar
tholomew) published a similar work, De proprietatibus rerum (1240-60).
The popularity and authority of these monstrosity-oriented books lasted
until the sixteenth century (Hodgen 1964:54-66).
It is important to note the role of the Church in maintaining the
ethnological fables of such writers as Isodore and Bartholomew.

Mer-

chantizing, evangelization, and war brought Europeans into contact with
other populations (Hodgen 1964:79).

It is assumed that those engaged

in these pursuits encountered other human beings besides monstrosities
and reported their findings to influential members o£ the European com
munity, notably officials of the Church.

The independent travels into

the Mongolian Empire by two Franciscan monks in service of the Church,
Carpini and Ruybroeck,

provide successive accounts of the same territory

giving credibility to information obtained.

Marco Polo brought back

tales of China and India with a merchant's bias (Thompson 1959:10-14).
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Traders, missionaries, pilgrims, and crusaders were all agents adding
to medieval knowledge of distant lands and peoples.

Despite the amount

of contact, very little was actually written about distant peoples and
customs.

Since the Church regarded all beyond its jurisdiction as hea

then and monstrous, every effort was made to retain distorted images of
these populations (Hodgen 1964:88).

The Church, then, must be regarded

as the prime agent in disseminating non-factual knowledge about humans
during the Middle Ages.
Early in the Renaissance Italian scholars began searching for the
origins of their own civilization in Roman and Greek sources.

It has

been suggested that this self-searching process was essential to the
development of anthropology, because a recognition of past time was neces
sitated.

"Only when men had learned to see differences by studying the

past were they able to observe contemporary differences in the world
around them" (Rowe 1965:8).

The flowering of intellectualism accompany

ing this search has been well documented and does not require reitera
tion here.

Suffice it to say that within the florescence of the Renais

sance, European society acknowledged its identity with Greek and Roman
cultural antiquities.

The ideas of Classical scholars became available

to fourteenth century scholars through translations, thereby, altering
the European intellectual climate significantly.
A humanistic attitude developed as a consequence of this Classical
influence.
sake.

Renaissance humanists were interested in man for his own

They sought the 'Whole Man* through a unity of culture with the

intellectual personality (Stromberg 1975:18).

Through archaeology, the

humanists gained historical awareness of the ancient world.

They were
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so enamored of the Classical world view that it was substituted for the
traditional Christian world view of the Middle Ages (Flemming 1970:190).
This reliance on the authroity of the ancients served to increase the
secularization of Renaissance thought, thereby, lessening the restric
tive influence of sacred authority.

It can be seen, then, that two dis

crete world views, Christian and Classical, were operative during the
preliminary stages to the Age of Discovery.
As noted, the Age of Discovery began ca. 1450 A.D. with the Portu
guese explorations of the African coast by Prince Henry the Navigator,
followed by Columbus' "discovery of the Americas."

To assume, however,

that there was no geographic discovery during the Middle Ages would be
erroneous.

The travels of Carpini, Ruybroeck, and Polo have already

been mentioned.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, exploration

and discovery by land contributed to knowledge of the European, Asian,
and North African landmasses.

Prince Henry and Columbus instituted mari

time exploration, thereby opening the entire world to discovery.

This

shift was significant because it was necessary to overcome medieval super
stitions founded in ignorance about the world before lengthy voyages
could be undertaken regularly.

Prince Henry disproved the notion that

equatorial regions were uninhabitable.

Columbus proved the earth was

not flat by sailing to what he took to be the East Indies.

Magellan's

expedition (he died before completion) further defined the globular natues of the earth by circumnavigating it.

Thus, while exploration and

discovery had taken place in the Middle Ages, the Age of Discovery was
properly ushered in by those ocean voyages which challenged the obses
sive hold of supersititon and which, by the sheer magnitude of newly
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acquired information, eventually forced a re-evaluation of traditional
knowledge.
By 1502 over 3000 miles of coastal South America had been explored
and numerous displays and parades of native Americans were made through
out Europe.

Despite the excitement of these discoveries, the strange

and bizarre were still emphasized in literature.

The discovery of the

New World initially appears to have made little impression on European
populations (Hodgen 1964:113).
During this period and throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries an enthusiastic preoccupation with the collection and display
of curios (e.g., coins, fossils) reflected the interest in discoveries,
if not concern for understanding them.

Human artifacts were often among

these curiosities but did not find display in their own right until the
seventeenth century (Hodgen 1964:122-3).

Of significance to ethnography

was the recording of manners and customs.

Classification of such col

lections was more complex than that of objects, since manners and customs
cannot be held and/or turned over for analysis.
sarily verbal and arbitrary.
the realm of ideas.

Classification is neces

Composed of definitions, it falls within

Conceptual themes, categories, and structures common

to all peoples had to be recognized by the compiler and then descriptively
conveyed to others (Hodgen 1964:164-5).
Perhaps the first work of this nature was Boemus' Omnium gentium
mores, leges, 5^ ritus ex. multis clarissimis rerum scriptorbius (1520).
The popularity of this collection is evidenced by twenty-three reissues
in five languages after a revised edition (1536) (Hodgen 19b4:l31).^
The work’s authority is questionable in that Boemus never traveled to
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any of the places he described.

The traditional cultural descriptive

formulae of the Middle Ages dominated the work as well as most such lit
erature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The cosmographers

and geographers, writing contemporaneously with Boemus, continued the
development of geographical awareness but contributed little to the
factual knowledge available on humans.

The great number of accounts

written by explorers and others in this time period served to bring the
diversity of customs and peoples to the attention of scholars but made
no attempt at systematic study of this diversity.
Gradually, the initial geographic interest shifted to an increasing
emphasis on ethnography (Slotkin 1965:45).

The result was a more "cos

mopolitan outlook and the use of the comparative method in the develop
ment of generalizations about social phenomena" (Slotkin 1965:38).
taigne (1533-1592) exemplified this new cosmopolitanism.

Mon

His works,

greatly influenced by his readings and travels, were focused on the sub
ject of humans (Slotkin 1965:55).

Montaigne was the exception rather

than the rule and, consequently, he did more than others to clarify the
problems of cultural description.
tural similarities in the data.

He used comparisons and sought cul
The fact that he made comparisons, in

dicates Montaigne’s acknowledgement of the cultural diversity made avail
able through geographic discovery.

Requiring a standard for comparison,

he chose Europe, since it was the culture base most familiar to his
reading audience.

This provided the comparative method of the time with

a distinct Europocentric slant (Hodgen 1964:191-3).

Although Montaigne

denied any ethnocentrism, others employing comparisons assumed European
superiority.

Montaigne could not accept the customs of his own society
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as necessarily more rational than those of other societies and even made
unfavorable comparisons by way of demonstration (Slotkin 1965:56).

Dif

ferences in personality types he attributed to geographical variation.
He regarded human beings as essentially the same (Slotkin 1965:61).
Natural laws were sought to replace notions of supernatural causation
of phenomena, foreshadowing the naturalism of the seventeenth and eigh
teenth centuries.

The ideas of Montaigne represent an important break

with the traditions of the Church and a definite advance toward profes
sional anthropology in terms of objectivity and cross-cultural compar
isons.
It has been stated that Montaigne was exceptional in his thinking,
given the period.

For most, recognition of the magnitude of human di

versity (biological and cultural) raised issues incompatible with reli
gious thought.

The problem confronted by sixteenth and seventeenth cen

tury scholars was that of placing the Indians of the New World into the
established scheme of Biblical tradition.

If Indians were viewed as

descendents of Noah, how did they arrive in the New World?

If they were

not descendents of Noah, then could they be regarded as human (Willey
and Sabloff 1974:25)?

The foundation of the ideology of Western civil

ization was being dramatically shaken.
as descendents of Ham.

African Negroes had been regarded

The Biblical account of the Tower of Babel had

provided the rationalization for diverse languages.

Physical variation

had been credited to differential environmental influence.
ericans simply did not fit into previous conceptions.

Native Am

The peopling of

America became a question stimulating considerable speculation, with
the notion of overland migration suggested as early as 1648— well before
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the navigations of Cooke in the late 1700s which mapped the Bering Straits
archipelago (Willey and Sabloff 1974:26).

The New World peoples were

often viewed as being descendents of the Lost Tribes of Israel.

More

usually they were assigned non-human status along with black populations.
This latter designation salved the consciences of those adopting slavery
since native Americans and blacks were viewed as animals without souls
(Shapiro 1964:343).
As the discussion has suggested, there were two fundamental points
of departure for evaluating the populations of the New World, the Chris
tian tradition and the Classical tradition.

The former categorized peo

ples on the basis of religious affiliation, either Christian or heathen.
Humanity was defined by receptivity to divine grace.

Classical heritage

classified peoples as either Greek (civilized) or barbarian.

Montaigne

expounded upon this application of terms in the sixteenth century when
he stated, "'everyone calls barbarian what is not his own usage"1 (quoted
in Elliott 1970:46).

In classical terms, humans were defined by ration

ality (as determined by the definer).

In 1537, Pope Paul III maintained

in the bull Sublimis Deus that Indians were "true men," after which In
dians were accredited with some degree of humanness.

Nevertheless, by

either tradition, Indians fell somewhere along a continuum from besti
ality to primaeval innocence (Elliott 1970:41-3).
The mind-set established by the Christian tradition was exemplified
by the substantial number of missionaries sent by the Church to convert
the heathens of the world.

The importance to anthropology of this de

sire to save the world may be questioned, but it may have increased the
ethnographic data base as a consequence of missionaries having extended
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periods of exposure to particular culture groups.

Unfortunately, mis

sionaries were less concerned with studying humans than with converting
them to Christianity— being of the attitude that Indians were creatures
of God under the control of the Devil.

It was part of God's design that

all should be shown the way to salvation (a philosophy supported by scrip
ture— Matthew 28:19-20— and still characteristic of today's Christian
religions).

Consequently, missionaries' accounts reflected the trials

and tribulations of conversion, only incidently providing insight into
manners and customs of the people.

Much of the work of missionaries

focused on gaining familiarity with a native culture's language, since
this would facilitate conversions.

Dictionaries and grammars of lan

guages resulted which assisted in more detailed explorations of culture,
most notably religion.

Many accounts of native culture based on mission

work were simply never published (Elliott 1970:34-5).

It was not until

the eighteenth century with Father Lafitau (1670-1740), a French Jesuit
missionary to the Iroquois, that we have the first extensive study of
ethnology using a comparative method (Glacken 1967:361).
Of less direct importance to anthropology, but of considerable rel
evance to ideological change, was the association between the discovery
of the New World and the rise of capitalism in the Old World.

In addi

tion to the Christian concern for the conversion of all the heathen of
the New World, tales of gold and similar treasures stimulated the adven
turous to endure the trials of a long ocean voyage and the potential
dangers of native savages.

The fact that the Americas were perceived

as the location of boundless wealth spurred greed in Europeans.

The

native Indian populations generally paid the prices of treachery, en-
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slavement, starvation, and death as a consequence of European greed
(Jones 1964:42).
That European economic life was transformed by the discovery of the
New World is evidenced by business expansion both within the newly devel
oping nation-states of Europe and in the Americas.

The latter provided

resources and new produce to Europe while supplying a market for Euro
pean goods (Elliott 1970:6).
ity for Europeans.

The Americas became the land of opportun

A four hundred year economic boom period has been

associated with these so-called "frontier" conditions (Elliott 1970:55).
Politically, the New World served to alter the European balance of
power.

Merchantilism shifted, with the change in trade from land to

maritime, from a Mediterranian locus to the Atlantic seaboard.

Coloni

zation of the Americas established wealth and power, with Great Britain,
France, and Spain accumulating the most territory (Elliott 1970:32-3).
In general, Europeans were less concerned with the study of man, than
they were with gathering data about natives which would facilitate Euro
pean exploitation of resources, taxation, and ruling of peoples.

There

is certainly no dearth of literature discussing the ramifications of
colonization; but, as greater depth would be tangential to this thesis,
no synthesis of this literature will be attempted.

Of note is the fact

that writings of this nature served to facilitate commercial pursuits
but contributed little or nothing to the explanation or understanding
of human diversity.
What, then, were the explanations given for the overwhelming human
diversity evidenced in the New World data?

It has been demonstrated

that, with the possible exception of Montaigne, no systematic effort
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had been made to understand human diversity.

Although the dichotomy

of Christian and Classical perspectives for native classification has
been discussed, such classification does not address the issue of ex
plaining diversity.

Instead, it groups diverse human characteristics

arbitrarily to facilitate incorporation of newly discovered but not neces
sarily understood peoples into a familiar and/or comfortable framework.
Attempts at explanation revived a controversial theoretical issue of
origins, specifically monogenesis versus polygenesis, which had been
laid to rest in favor of the former by Saint Augustine in the Middle
Ages (Penniman 1965:35).
Defined briefly, monogenesis pertains to the origin and development
of a species from the creation of a single mating pair.

In the case of

humans, monogeneticists assumed— based on scriptural authority— that
pair to have been Adam and Eve.

Biblical account later attributes des

truction of the world population except for Noah, his three sons, and
their wives, to the occurrence of a universal flood.

These four couples

(descendents of Adam) were credited with repopulating the world, explain
ing human diversity.

The major problem besetting monogenesis was demon

strating the presence of multiformity out of the assumption of uniformity
This, of course, is the crux of the issue in explaining human diversity.
Monogeneticists, founding their theory on blind faith, used prim
aeval perfection and degeneration from that perfection as their explan
ation for human variety.

Degeneration was regarded as the continuation

of the falling away from grace, from the perfection of the Garden of
Eden.

It was not restricted to humans and their institutions but the

earth, too, was decaying.

Time was the agent of degeneration, and change
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inevitably yielded decay.

All beings in the shape of man were the con

sequence of the original creation and, similarly, were subject to the
same original sin.

Recall the Christian classificatory basis for humans

as receptivity to divine grace.

New World savages were simply humans

living in innocence,^ unaware of their ungodliness— the ultimate in de
generation.

With proper guidance (i.e., from European missionaries),

they would ’see the light,' leaving their heathen ways to become Christains, Christianity being regarded as the only way to compensate for
human fraility, i.e., sin.
Diffusion, the transmission of cultural traits from one group to
another, was seen as a mechanism of degeneration.
necessarily cultural decline.

Culture change was

An attitude of monogenetic origin of a

divine nature necessitated moving away from a perfect center.
movement through time and space accounted for diffusion.

Human

The greater

the distance between groups and the amount of time from separation, the
more likely degeneration was to occur.

The resultant diversity and its

evil underpinnings could readily be viewed in the known world.

Chris

tianity had been introduced to the world to save it from total decay.
It was, therefore, the responsibility of the Church to save humanity from
what would otherwise be inevitable destruction.

(See Hodgen 1964:254-

69 for a more thorough discussion of these issues.)
It is important to recognize that human diveristy at that time was
realized in terms of manners and customs, without any racial connotation.
Physical variation was explained in environmental terms.

For instance,

the theory of differential exposure of white skin to the sun's rays an
swered the question of pigmentation variation.

As Hodgen (1964:214)

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

17

explains, "People were differentiated from one another as 'nations,'
while the term 'race' carried a zoological connotation properly applic
able only to animals."

The modern notion of race did not evolve until

the nineteenth century.
Opposed to monogenesis was the theory of polygenesis.

Polygenesis

attempted to explain human diveristy by postulating multiple creations
rather than a single creation.

Issac de la Peyrere (1594-1676) was a

major spokesman for this viewpoint.

He first cast doubt on the histor

ical validity of the Book of Genesis and, then, proceeded to propose,
in essence, that if creation could happen once with Adam and Eve, it
could happen more than once in other parts of the world.

La Peyrere's

works, Praeadamitae and Systema theologicum ex prae-Adamitarum hypothesi
presented his polygenetic thesis (Hodgen 1964:272-6).
Others felt that the theory of degeneration was too negativistic.
Men like Machiavelli (1469-1527), Le Roy (ca. 1510-1517), and Bodin (15301556) were empiricists and secularists who supported an attitude of cyc
lical history.

Advancement as well as degeneration were phases in the

cyclical process.

They pointed to the histories of several nations as

demonstrating this order-decay-order pattern (Hodgen 1964:270-2).
Perhaps foremost in disrupting the grip of the degenerationists
was the sixteenth century environmentalist, Jean Bodin.

Convinced of

the validity of geographical determinism, Bodin filled his books Collo
quium, Republique. and Methodus with illustrative material taken from
historical and geographical sources.

Human and cultural diversity was

seen as the result of the peculiarities of the environment— land, climate,
topographical features.

Bodin stressed the comparison of history and
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historical materials for social inquiry.

His greatest influence was

on English cosmographers and geographers (Hodgen 1964:276-90).
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THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY:

De Waal Malefijt suggests

THE AGE OF REASON AND SCIENCE

that

the main ingredients for an objective approach to
the study of society and culture were present by
the end of the sixteenth century: a separation from
theology, a waning reliance on older authorities,
and a consideration of literate as well as nonlit
erate cultures for comparative purposes.
Still
lacking were systematic, objective observations,
and a conscious application of scientific principles
(1974:58).
The

science of the seventeenth century contributed the missing scientific

principle, i.e., to understand

complex phenomena it is necessary to re

duce them to their simplest, most basic elements (de Waal Malefijt 1974:
64).

The generalizations sought were the laws of nature and the universe.

The development of seventeenth century scientific principles were funda
mental to the continued attitude change necessary for the professional
ization of anthropology; but, within the century attitudes toward the
study of man in fact changed very little.
With respect to the intellectual climate, the seventeenth century
has been labeled a transitional period (Hampson 1968:32).

It is a re

markable period in terms of intellectual geniuses and their influence
in the dramatic alteration of world view.

The revolution, which began

with the work of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, changed the Western
world concept from terracentric to heliocentric.

In the process of des

troying medieval cosmology, science had expanded the traditional "closed
world" view into that of an "infinite universe" (Stromberg 1975:46).
The magnitude of this change in perspective and the difficulty the common
19
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person had in incorporating it into his personal world view seems rough
ly analogous to the impact of the discovery of the Americas and the dif
ficulty of digesting the tremendous human diversity revealed by discov
ery.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the heliocentric theory

had achieved relatively greater acceptance than had human diversity, but
then, the latter's study needed the principles of the former, so such
a circumstance should not be surprising.
Two of the most influential men in this transitional period were
Bacon (1561-1626) and Descartes (1596-1650).

Each contributed funda

mental elements to modern science but neither recognized the value of
the other's contribution.

Disciples of each continued the struggle, and

it was not until Newton synthesized the two approaches that modern sci
ence was genuinely born.

"With the great synthesis and summation made

of the laws of motion and of gravity by Issac Newton in 1687, all obscur
ities seemed cleared up; the pieces fell into place, nature revealed its
secrets, and Europe prepared to enter into its optimistic Enlightenment"
(Stromberg 1975:61).

This, of course, is simplistic but sufficient for

the purposes of this thesis.
Bacon initiated the century as a strong proponent of developing the
new sciences.

He inveighed against the ancients despite his acknowledge

ment of Greek and Roman scholars as the last to advance science and his
own use of Aristotelian ideas.
teleological approach.

Ancient science was burdened by its

Bacon emphasized inductive reasoning, the need

for directed experimentation, and the importance of recording experiments.
Although he did little in the line of theory building, Bacon stimulated
scientific hypothesis construction and testing as well as the search
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for general laws in science (Butterfield 1956:72-82).

He has often been

referred to as the "father of inductive science" (Stromberg 1975:47).
Stromberg (1975:54) has labeled Descartes as "the strongest single
force working on seventeenth century thought."

As Bacon, Descartes re

jected previous knowledge as inadequate and commenced to reconstruct
all knowledge, recognizing only the self as a point of departure.

The

self, being a consequence of thought, could not be denied; hence, cogito
ergo sum.

Based on the assumptions that "the essential capacity to see

reason was distributed throughout the human race without any difference
of degree" and that "[a]11 things which we clearly and distinctly con
ceive are true" (Butterfield 1956:84), Descartes developed a mechanistic
vision of a perfectly ordered, unified, and interlocked universal sci
ence.

Deductive reasoning and mathematics were the keystones of Car

tesian thought.

In contrast to Bacon, he had little concern for care

fully designed experimentation.

His most significant work, affecting

the conceptualization of a "clockwork universe," was his A Discourse
on Method (1637).

The work is regarded by Butterfield as particularly

important in intellectual history, suggesting its impact was strengthened
by having been written in the vernacular.

Descartes apparently designed

the book to speak to the "natural reason of men whose minds had not been
perverted by the traditions of the schools" (Butterfield 1956:82).
Butterfield (1956:138-9) expresses agreement with Bacon and Des
cartes rejection of thought since antiquity by crediting the Renaissance
with mere recovery and assimilation and contributing little, if any,
innovative thought.

In contrast, he credits the seventeenth century

with brilliant, creative activity.

Major advances were being made in
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all natural sciences except chemistry.

Traditional attitudes and assump

tions were subjected to critical scrutiny, frequently being rejected.
Seventeenth century scientists and philosophers, following Descartes,
detached m a n ’s physical nature from his mind.

The natural world came

to be seen as inert physical matter based on mechanical relationships,
rather than in organic analogy.

Scientists chose to concentrate on an

object’s observable properties, rather than seeking its intangible 'es
sence' (Stromberg 1975:46).
Man,

in his new awareness of his separation from nature by way

of

soul (mind), and of the predictability of the mechanical laws ofnature,
soon came to realize his power over nature.
As science seemed to establish itself on an impreg
nable basis of experimentally verified fact, doubt
and confusion eventually gave way to self-confidence,
and belief that the unknown was merely the undiscov
ered, and the general assumption— unprecidented in
the Christian era— that man was to a great extent
the master of his own destiny (Hampson 1968:35).
Philosophical speculation shifted from the supernatural realm to the
natural.

Similarly, legitimation in thought shifted from authority based

on faith to that of scientific experimentation (Flemming 1970:268).

This

secularization which coincided with the scientific revolution was not a
circumstance solely of the revolution, however.

Hampson (1968:29) cites

dissention within theology as the greatest cause of the Church’s decline
in intellectual authority.

Notable for its criticism was the work of

Father Richard Simon, Critical History of the Old Testament (1678) which
questioned the authorship of the Pentateuch (Stromberg 1975:123).

Further

evidence of theological dissention was the proliferation of Protestant
sects breaking from the universal Church and the political decline in
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power reflected by the rise of nation-states out of the Holy Roman Empire.
While these last events occurred prior to the seventeenth century, their
ramifications for increasing seventeenth century secularization should
not be underestimated.
Some attempts were made to apply the scientific principle of reductionism to the social sciences in the seventeenth century.

When applied

to social institutions, a comparative method developed from which emerged
the concept of culture as learned behavior (de Waal Malefijt 1974:65).
The comparative method used in the study of religions led to a more relativistic attitude, especially toward the religious diversity uncovered
by the geographic discoveries of previous decades which was just begin
ning to be recognized (Butterfield 1956:143).

In the effort to discover

the laws of human nature and social life, social philosophers searched
for common culture items and behavior patterns which were thought to be
closest to original human nature (de Waal Malefijt 1974:71).

Be that as

it may, there were few anthropological contributions in the seventeenth
century, leaving the proliferation of social thought to eighteenth and
nineteenth century thinkers.
The seventeenth century has characteristically been referred to as
the Age of Reason.

Its major thinkers— Galileo, Bacon, Newton, Descartes,

Spinoza, Hobbes, Leibniz, and Locke— strove "to perfect a method of sci
entific analysis that was careful, rigorous, logical, and naturalistic
in that it did not refer directly to supernatural causes" (Stromberg 1975:
122).

God was viewed as the final guarantee of an orderly universe but

the phenomena themselves were essentially explanable by the laws of nature.
Newton, the great scientific synthesizer, supported theism by fusing re
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ligion and science, but it was his scientific advances which most influ
enced Enlightenment thinkers.

Locke (1632—1704), the great synthesizer

of political thought, developed the philosophy which was to dominate eigh
teenth century thought (Stromberg 1975:111).

Locke has been regarded as

the pivotal point in the secular transition.

His philosophy supported

Deism which sought the principles of natural religion.

These underlying

principles were considered to be universal irreducible truth.

Because

of his tremendous influence on Enlightenment thought, discussion of Locke
will be left to the eighteenth century.
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THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE ENLIGHTENMENT
AND THE NOTION OF PROGRESS

Looking at the generalized intellectual climate of the eighteenth
century, one must acknowledge two primary national influences.

France

had become the European model of taste in literature, art, architecture,
and refinement in social behavior.

Across the Channel, Britain exempli

fied an ideal of civil liberty being guaranteed to all with education
and influence rather than only to those born into certain families, civil
liberty then being an inherited right.
tural.

Europe was predominantly agricul

The few towns which flourished were associated with industry which

maintained traditional methodologies under the regulations of guilds es
tablished during the Renaissance.
The area exhibiting a substantial rate of change capable of effecting
alteration in social forces was oceanic commerce.

The switch from Medi

terranean-centered to Atlantic seaboard-centered trade networks signif
icantly increased capital development in England, France, and the Nether
lands.

This development is reflected demographically by tremendous popu

lation growth, particularly in France and Britain.

A new class conscious

ness developed among the merchants as they "developed a new self-confi
dence that matched their standard of living and awareness of their increased
importance to the national economy" (Hampson 1968:47).
Gentlemen formed more of a social club during the eighteenth century
than in preceding and following periods.

They shared a common language

(French) and culture (Western Eruopean).

A cosmopolitan society existed

25
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in which communication between men and of ideas prevailed.
become so common that travelers and their books abounded.

Travel had
As the cen

tury progressed, the international exchange of ideas increased in momen
tum.

London-Paris-Amsterdam developed into the main communication tri

angle for intellectual thought (Hampson 1968:71-2).

The particular con

tributions of this environment to the development of anthropology will
be examined in this section.
The notion of degeneration has been discussed as being prevalent
in seventeenth century thought.

It continued to be common in the next

century, but as natural science successfully instilled greater confidence
in the capabilities of humanity, people not only became aware of their
power over nature, they construed this power to be limitless.

(The En

lightenment misconception of limitless power over nature unfortunately
persists in the twentieth century.)

Eighteenth century scholars were

aware that the science of the preceding century had greatly increased
technological knowledge.

Reason, a consequence of seventeenth century

Cartesian-dominated thought, ’enlightened' eighteenth century thinkers,
precipitating an idea of progress as the advancement of knowledge (Garbarino 1977:13).

It appeared that humans, given reason, could continually

improve, eventually achieving perfection.

The following assumptions under

lay the Enlightenment notion of progress:

"(1) that advancement in know

ledge is natural and necessary, certain and endless; (2) that advancement
in knowledge can only proceed slowly, and by insensible degrees; and (3)
that knowledge is continually advancing toward perfection” (Teggart 1962:
89).
During the Enlightenment the ’study of man' became a significant pursuit.
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The principles of nature were fundamental to this study-

A mechanistic

aspect of nature was envisioned in which purposeful principles of organ
ization and process ruled nature.

Through science, the laws of nature

could be discovered (Voget 1975:50-1).

Cartesian mechanical philosophy

underlay the eighteenth century search.
[T]he laws of Nature came to be thought of as the
orderly provisions which Nature makes for the real
ization of certain specific purposes, these purposes,
discernible by the exercise of reason, being nothing
other than the promotion of progress and happiness
of mankind (Teggart 1962:90).
For the purposes of clarity, it should be reiterated that Descartes
theorized that the human mind, characterized by innate ideas, was dis
tinct from the human body which was physical and governed by mechanistic,
natural laws.

Late in the seventeenth century Locke challenged and sub

sequently rejected the cogito ergo sum aspect of Cartesian philosophy,
postulating instead that the human mind was empty at birth and all know
ledge was learned.

The Lockean tabula rasa concept emphasized the social

ization process through the improvement of the social environment (Strom
berg 1975:116).

"The inescapable consequence of this doctrine is that

different experiences, or in modern terms, differential environmental
exposure, will produce both individual and national differences in be
havior" (Harris 1968:12).

Environmental determinism was not original

with Locke; Bodin introduced it in the sixteenth century.

But Locke

encouraged experimentation, the scientific approach, and used evidence
from non-European societies to support his contentions.

'(Bodin also

made use of 'ethnographic' evidence, although fewer data were readily
available to him due to the recentness of discoveries and the censor
ship of the Church.)
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Four philosophical implications of Locke came to dominate eighteenth
century thought.

(1)

Belief being regarded as a product of the environ

ment, ideological toleration was encouraged.

(2) Despite environmental

differences, all men were viewed as potentially equal.

(3) Through reg

ulation of material conditions, a society could facilitate the moral
improvement of its members.

(4)' A new psychology and an educational

attitude developed "based on the belief that human irrationality was the
product of erroneous association of ideas, that had become fixed in child
hood" (Hampson 1968:39).
In England, deists, applying Lockean notions, concluded that rea
son without revelation was sufficient to understand religion and morality
properly.

Hence, Christianity was unnecessary.

Only a prime mover, a

creator, was required to start the processes of nature.

While the deist

following was never in the majority, the members were sufficiently out
spoken to cause orthodox Christianity to be more generally questioned.
The English Enlightenment, begun by deists and philosopher-scientists like Locke and Newton, eventually jumped the Channel, influencing
the thinkers of the Continent, particularly those in France.

Religious

controversy was more acrimonious in France than it had been in England.
One reason for this was that freedom of thought as expressed in publica
tions was greater in Britain than in France.
torversy greater air, allowing it to blossom.
every dogma.

This freedom gave the conEnglish deists attacked

"If God himself could be put on trial (as someone said of

the deistic debate in England), what was sacred" (Stromberg 1975:128)?
Another reason for the bitterness of the religious controversy in France
was the strength of the Jesuit faction in influencing the belief structure
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between 1700 and 1760.
In 1721, Montesquieu (1689-1755) initiated the new spirit into
France.

Due to publication restrictions, Persian Letters was published

in the Netherlands and smuggled into France.

The work breathed new life

into a society only recently released from an epoch of "solemn authority"
under the rule of Louis XIV who died in 1715.

Persian Letters served

to bring awareness of the Middle East to the public as ". . . two Per
sians visit Europe and pass comment on its curious customs, comparing
them to their own, in letters to each other" (Stromberg 1975:131-2).
Through analogy monks become dervishes, the pope becomes a wizard, and
religious rites are regarded as superstition.

The good life is stressed

as of prime importance, with religion serving as the guide to it.
anthropological relevance of Persian Letters is obvious.

The

Cross-cultural

awareness and relativism had been promoted.
The essence of deism was expressed by Voltaire (1694-1778) in his
"Profession of Faith of the Theist" (1764).-*

Stromberg summarizes Vol

taire's thought as follows:
God exists. He is a remote deity who probably does
not concern himself directly in the affairs of men.
But it is good for the people, at least, to believe
that he rewards virtue and punishes sin. There is
a universal original, primitive religion, simple and
rational. All religions derive from the same source
(1975:129).
As this passage indicates, natural religion is perceived through reason.
But only the enlightened few are capable of such perception.

The masses

need guidance because they are influenced by irrational hopes and fears.
Consequently, religion is needed to provide the populace with the direc
tion of the priests.
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Voltaire was a prominent spokesman for the French Enlightenment,
perhaps too prominent for the best interest of evolutionary thought.
Maupertuis (1698-1759) and Voltaire were both disciples of Newton and
Locke.

In 1736 the latter man traveled to Peru and, under the leadership

of Maupertuis, participated in an expedition to Lapland.

The joint expe

dition proved the Newtonian theory that the world was not flattened at
the poles as claimed by the Cartesians.

The data accumulated from these

expeditions were used by Voltaire subjectively to support his own theo
ries.

Maupertuis carefully considered the diversity he encountered and,

after experimentation, developed theories of evolution, natural selection,
and genetics.
love.

Unfortunately, the two men were rivals in both science and

The greater misfortune, in terms of scientific advancement, was

that Voltaire was the more influential of the two and succeeded in dis
crediting Maupertuis' theories of evolution— not a difficult task consid
ering the eighteenth century static, creationist world view.
Greater freedom in French publications after 1740 allowed more tol
erance of the outspoken ideas of the philosophes (Voltaire and Montesquieu,
among others).

Knowledge as a whole rather than as a collection of sep

arate parts was important to eighteenth century thinkers.

Expressive of

this attitude was the substantial work of Diderot (1713-1784).

Encyclo

paedia was a compendium of current knowledge and 'enlightened* opinions
which attempted to include everything of value to the period (Hampson
1968:86).

Despite its prohibitive expense, Encyclopaedia was regarded

as a symbol of status, and all who were able displayed its volumes along
with the plays of Voltaire and Buffon's Natural History.
Traditional religion did not remain stagnant during the period of
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scientific advance.

Seventeenth century scientists had allowed for su

pernatural causation by suggesting that God revealed truths through sci
ence.

Science, therefore, was viewed as a tool of God who could be known

through His works as a consequence of reason (Voget 1975:45-6).

In the

eighteenth century the concept of divine bienfaisance or ’Providence'
was coined.

Acting as an agent of divine benevolence towards humanity,

Providence was interpreted anthropocentrically by Christians.

All the

natural laws disclosed by science were regarded as being for man's bene
fit and under the guidance of God.

Hence, order, the reflection of Prov

idence, and progress, a natural law, were not in conflict with Christian
ity (Hampson 1968:79-82).

Deism, also, made use of bienfaisance but only

as an initiator.
Vico (1668-1744) in his work, The New Science (1725), provided a
good example of the combination of traditional Christian views and the
concept of orderly process revealed by science (Voget 1975:46).

His pri

mary contribution to anthropology was his insight that society was manmade.

Changes, he claimed, were best explained within one's own social

context; therefore, an historical perspective was necessary to understand
ing culture.

Further, non-literate peoples were to be regarded as full

members in socio-cultural traditions (de Waal Malefijt 1974:78).

Vico

has been regarded as a theoretical pioneer of m o d e m history (Stromberg
1975:175).
As deism was useful to anthropological development by weakening the
hold of traditional religion, so skepticism served to further the decline
of blind faith.

Scottish philosopher, David Hume (1711-1776) sowed the

seeds of skepticism in 1748 with An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.
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He discredited the deists by demonstrating that no factual support existed
for natural morality or religion as being perceived by all men in terms
of reason alone (Stromberg 1975:126-7).

Hume developed five arguments

which became a counter-philosophy to Enlightenment thought and influenced
the Romanticism of the nineteenth century.

First, Hume did not acknow

ledge a concept of 'mind' but only a series of psychic happenings.
he could establish no proof of the validity of causal inferences.
not reason, was thought to support scientific laws.

Second,
Custom,

Third, reason was

regarded as either abstract as in mathematics and logic or empirical,
i.e., experimental.

Reason, consequently, played a negligable part in

life since it was not innate or experiential.

Hume’s fourth argument

was that God could not be demonstrated by reason.

Given the spirit of

the times and Hume’s embracing of the scientific method, such a statement
not only denied God by reason but also by revelation.
encouraged atheism is not surprising.

That skepticism

Finally, social utility, a concept

popularized in the eighteenth century, was expounded upon by Hume in his
statements on government.

The good or bad qualities of government were

discernible by its usefulness to the community (Stromberg 1975:160-3).
The atheistic tendencies of Hume's philosophy were developed by the
French materialists.

Men like d'Holbach (1723-1789) felt that reason

was subject to natural law, providing a guide to human destiny.

Science,

as the gift of reason, had liberated humanity from the grip of supersti
tion which had confined people to the regulations of the Church.

Espousing

atheism, d'Holbach and others emphasized human nature and served to fur
ther the disruption of the Christian influence on society (Voget 1975:47).
By 1760, philosophical thought was divided between skepticism and
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determinism, at least among the few to whom the works of the great thin
kers were available.

The general public was still not strongly influenced

since the Church, essentially opposed to the Enlightenment, regulated
the spread of new ideas through clerical censorship (Hampson 1968:12831).

For the masses the Bible presented the literal truth, the Christian

order.

Followers of the new scientific and intellectual movement proposed

that Moses was an unreliable historian, questioning God's role in the
universe.

Hume claimed there existed no objective knowledge of any kind,

and d'Holbach removed any need for divine causation by regarding the uni
verse as matter in motion.

Everything occurred of necessity and could

not be otherwise (Hampson 1968:95).
Discussion thus far has been concerned with the currents operating
to weaken traditional world views in the early eighteenth century, a nec
essary condition for the thesis of this paper.

It is clear, however,

that the coherence and confidence of the Enlightenment rested primarily
on the foundation of either natural or revealed religion.
the other, religion provided stability.

One way or

The eighteenth century world

view remained static, with a single act of creation establishing land,
plants, and animals as those known at the time, i.e., fixed species (Hamp
son 1968:81).
It will be recalled that sixteenth and seventeenth century attempts
at classification of peoples were based on conversion potential or degree
of rationality— the Christian or Classical traditions, respectively.
During the Age of Reason, humans were thought to be above nature (supraorganic) by virtue of being part of a special environment— society.
ality was organized at three levels:

Re

inorganic, organic, and social or
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psychosocial.

Man, not being governed by instinct as other animals, was

distinguished from them by his rational (moral) nature.

Society was seen

as a natural state of humanity (Voget 1975:55).
Attempts were made in the eighteenth century to develop a scheme
of classification and ordering according to natural laws of the new or
ganic forms (flora and fauna) recognized from geographic discoveries.
Linnaeus (1707-1778) proposed a graded series of created types in his
System Naturae (1735) in which he included man as a primate.

While clas

sified with primates, man was grouped as a single species, Homo sapiens,
being unified as such by virtue of reason and being separated from other
primates by his social capabilities (e.g., language, morality) and reason
(Voget 1975:60).

This classificatory system forms the basis of current

taxonomic and evolutionary thinking, but it is generally felt that
the potentially subversive nature of the transfer
[man from a Biblical to a zoological system] was
recognized neither by Linne nor by the Church, and
it is not an unwarranted assumption that it had much
to do with eventually opening the mind to evolution
ary doctrines that inevitably included man who had
become an integral part of the zoological world
(Shapiro 1964:344).
Still, Linnaeus was very cautious about postulating any evolutionary
notion which would constitute heresy and seemed, generally, to argue
for the fixity of species (Slotkin 1965:180).
Buffon (1707-1788) also recognized a similarity between humans and
apes but refused to accept their affinity based on the purely human at
tribute of a soul.

Monogenetic degeneration

(all humans derived from

the same primal type) characterized Buffon's theory.

Variation was ex

plainable by environmental differences.
Both Linnaeus and Buffon, among the majority of others concerned
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with devising a systematic scheme of organic classification, were pro
ponents of what Lovejoy designated as the Great Chain of Being concept
(Eiseley 1958:6).

Blumenbach (1752-1840) denied the concept.

He clas

sified man separately, not only from primates but also from mammals
(Slotkin 1965:187).

Reason set humans so far apart from animals as to

make it impossible to place the two in the same scale.
These three attempts at delineating the System of Nature are men
tioned briefly as indicative of the classificatory efforts of the period.
A more detailed discussion will be reserved for the section on evolution
to be presented later.

Our concern at this point is with cultural rather

than biological diversity.
Enlightenment scholars considered humans to be social animals sep
arated from other animals by the ability to reason.

Studying social

phenomena would reveal similarities in culture contributing to general
human nature.

Stimulated by the scientific search for general laws be

gun in the seventeenth century and the Newtonian idea that nature was
reducible to a single great law or, at least, relatively few laws, and
since advancements in the natural sciences were so convincing, scholars
interested in understanding society attempted to apply scientific method
ology to social phenomena.

Laws of nature were thought to govern social

phenomena and, therefore, were capable of discovery via inductive and
deductive reasoning.

The problem with this notion was not in the applic

ability of scientific reasoning to the study of society but in the inaability of the eighteenth century scholars to make use of induction.
Adherence to the assumptions of progress, discussed above, resulted
not in a concern for the conditions of progress, but rather with the
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obstacles to progress.

Commitment to a metaphysical notion of progress

in natural law inhibited inductive reasoning (Voget 1975:62), thereby,
restricting the eighteenth century progressivist contribution to anthro
pology.
With the tremendous quantity of diverse biological and cultural
data available as a result of geographic discovery in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the System of Nature sought by Enlightenment thin
kers was not immediately apparent.

In an effort to reduce this extreme

diversity to workable proportions, scholars sought analogues between
their familiar European culture and the unfamiliar cultures of which
they were increasingly becoming aware.

Because they wished to determine

that which was 'natural,' the abnormalities, peculiarities, and acci
dental characteristics noted within societies were ignored as not per
tinent to understanding human nature (Teggart 1962:90-1).

It can be

seen that such a notion is quite in contrast to the medieval and Renais
sance emphasis on the bizarre.
In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, comparisons were
generally made between the existing, observable social conditions of
so-called 'savage' societies and those conditions of ancient civilized
peoples known through early historical records.

Teggart enumerates sev

eral examples of the application of this form of comparative method (1962:
93-5).

By the mid-eighteenth century, the notion of progress from an

cient to modern and the attitude that the present 'savage' state was
representative of the early civilized state had been established as fun
damental assumptions.

Based on similarities observed among world cultures,

scholars sought a synthesis which would reveal the uniform series of de-
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velopmental stages of mankind (Teggart 1962:96).
It should be mentioned that these scholars did not base their syn
thesis on personally made observations taken from fieldwork situations.
Instead, the reports of missionaries, traders, navigators, military of
ficers, administrators, and captives were sifted through for ethnographic
data.

Reliability was assumed if some degree of concensus was discern

ible (Voget 1967:136-7).

Particularly helpful to this process of syn

thesis was the contribution of J. N. Demeunier, an eighteenth century
French Ethnographer,' who translated numerous ethnographic and travel
reports (Harris 1968:17).

It is assumed that Demeunier translated these

works into French which had replaced Latin as the common European lan
guage (Hampson 1968:53).
Analogical introspection was the technique used by progressivists
to allow documentation of savage and civilized thought processes.

Rea

soning with the aid of analogy was suggested by Locke as constituting
a uniform intellectual process.

His empirical associational psychology,

i.e., sensory-ideas form the first step in the organization of knowledge,
became the theoretical basis for progressivists (Voget 1967:140-1).
In essence, the Lockean position was that "despite differences in exper
ience, reason, correctly applied, would eventually lead man, everywhere,
to the same social institutions, moral beliefs, and scientific technical
truths" (Harris 1968:13).

The notion of psychic unity established the

common ground among members of humanity.

Given this basic assumption

in conjunction with the principle of simplicity-complexity, eighteenth
century scholars sought the origins and progressive stages of civiliza
tion.
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Traditionally, history had been viewed from an individualistic per
spective.

In the eighteenth century the emphasis on nature resulted

in a concern for natural history which was people oriented.

The stress

now being placed on the group or social element of society led to interest
in institutions, customs, and ideas— cultural facts (Voget 1975:52).
Establishment of ethnographic fact as a descriptive and measurable unit
of study distinguished progressivists from historians.
Commonly, cultural differences had been explained by sole reference
to the physical environment, particularly, climate.

The early environ

mental deterministic work of Bodin has already been discussed.

By the

time of Montesquieu in the eighteenth century, environmental determinism
was the principal explanation for cultural diversity.

De I 1esprit des

lois (1748) made good use of the expanding literature of the Age of Dis
covery to 'substantiate' determinism.

However, Montesquieu was not con

tent with single factor explanations for anything as complex as cultural
diversity.

£\

Instead, the work demonstrated the interrelationship of

social, geographical, political, economic, and religious forces— a func
tionalist approach to the study of the legal institution which may be
regarded as the starting point of sociology (Hampson 1968:114-5) or at
least of the social sciences.

As Montesquieu states:

"'Mankind are

influenced by various causes:

by the climate, by the religion, by the

laws, by the maxims of government, by precedents, morals, and customs;
whence is formed a general spirit of nations'" (quoted in de Waal Malefijt
1974:80).

Significantly, Montesquieu promoted cultural relativity by

abandoning an ethnocentric viewpoint.

His writing suggested a three-

stage developmental progression for human history:

hunting or savagery,
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herding or barbarism, and civilization (Garbarino 1977:14-5).
Turgot (1727-1781), in Plan for Two Discourses on Universal His
tory (1750), synthesized cultural diversity into three stages of human
development similar to those presented by Montesquieu.

In keeping with

the times, biological factors were not regarded as primary to accounting
for cultural diversity.

Instead, Turgot emphasized cultural factors

such as education, environment, and relative isolation from other peoples
(Garbarino 1977:15).

Credited with formulating many modern anthropolog

ical principles, Turgot recognized
that culture is learned, that it constitutes a whole,
that it is transmitted from generation to generation
by means of symbolic language, and that it is cummulative in as far as past achievements are added
to the common store of knowledge. . . . that each
cultural advance accelerates the rate of change,
that diffusion plays a larger role than independent
invention; he gave cogent explanations for the exis
tence of cultural and personal differences, and he
stressed the relationships between cultures instead
of considering them as separate entities (de Waal
Malefijt 1974:85).
The rise of civilization tended to be associated with the rise of
technology, advancing from hunting-gathering through pastoralism, plant
domestication, and finally commerce (Voget 1975:65).

Condorcet (1743-

1794), in Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progres de 1*esprit humain
(1793),

carried the assigning of stages in human development to the ex

treme by suggesting ten periods.
as the next to the last stage.

The then current period was regarded
This notion of present European civili

zation as being superior or near perfection reflects a Europocentric
attitude characteristic of most scholars.

Condorcet, in fact, ignored

the data available from geographic discoveries, relying instead, on the
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classical tradition and European history for his development model.
Regardless, Condorcet's work was illustrative of a dominant influence
for anthropology and sociology in the study of man, that being the "pro
cedure of delineating the cultural development of mankind in the form
of an 'ideal' or generalized series" (Teggart 1962:97).
The eighteenth century progressivist school of thought was well
represented by the Scotch historians— Hume, Smith, Ferguson, Karnes, Rob
ertson, Millar, and Monboddo (Voget 1967:132).

Based on the notion of

the psychic unity of mankind, the Scotch school developed a unilineal
theory of cultural evolution similar to that of the nineteenth century
evolutionists.

The social nature of man was stressed, a naturalistic

perspective prevailed, and institutions provided the focus for most of
their works (Slotkin 1965:412-60).

Progressivist ideas, which have been

discussed above, pertain to the Scotch school.
Limitations in data distinguish eighteenth from nineteenth century
progressivists.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the entire geo

graphical world had been mapped.

The three voyages of Cooke in the last

part of the century contributed greatly to this project.

Ethnographic

data were collected by natural scientists and historians providing a
sound base for the early nineteenth century ethnographers.

Before dis

cussing early nineteenth century ethnography and its role in the pro
fessionalization of anthropology, however, it will be of value to look
generally at the transitional nature of the period's intellectual en
vironment and the development of evolutionary theories.
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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

"Because of the complexities and variety of responses to it, the
nineteenth century is a difficult century to 'place* in human history,
or to access as a whole" (Briggs 1970a:25).

Given this assessment of

the nineteenth century, it will be advantageous to provide a brief in
troduction of the principal forces that influenced intellectual thought.
Two major revolutions interacted to produce the early nineteenth
century environment.
the century.
power.

The French Revolution of 1789 became a symbol of

Eighteenth century France had been the leading European

It had the greatest population, an economic growth rate compar

able to that of Great Britain, and produced some of the greatest thinkers
of the period.

French revolutionary philosophy emphasizing liberty,

human dignity,- and the rights of man affected the rest of Europe.

The

fall of the Bastille, along with (perhaps more importantly) the burning
of manor-houses and castles by peasants, represents the overthrow of a
former order (Roberts 1970:57).

Based on the French example, "'nation

alism' in the name of the sovereignty of the people was a strong enough
force to guide, even to dictate, the course of particular revolutionary
movements" in other countries (Briggs 1970a:26).
In Great Britain, the Industrial Revolution shaped the early nine
teenth century.
trial use.

Steam power had been developed and instituted for indus

A sizeable textile factory industry had been established

which had begun exporting.

A labor force composed primarily of women
41
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and children evolved its own consciousness and institutions, forming a
'working class.*

Introduction of a steam engine-powered railway marked

the technical climax of what Mumford called "carboniferous capitalism"
— an iron and coal based economy (Briggs 1970a:27-8).
Between 1789 and 1851 the 'industrializing, individualizing, sec
ularizing, and politicizing of European society' represented what has
been called "'the end of the Middle Ages."'

Industrialization resulted

in a new economic order evidenced by a shift from a status to a market
society with a concomitant decline in agricultural elements.

New insti

tutions appeared such as banks, stock exchanges, and a commercial press.
Commercial codes of law were formulated, capital accumulation was rapid,
mercantilism was increasingly criticized, and free trade was advocated.
The individual achieved new dignity and significance; ambition became
respectable (Roberts 1970:66).
Skepticism, a strong influence initiated by Hume in the eighteenth
century, continued to encourage secularization in the nineteenth century.
Greater separation of Church and State occurred with the Church conceding
to its new position by entering politics to achieve its goals.

Fear of

revolution, stimulated by the French Revolution, strengthened the inten
sity of religious faith.

Evangelical and pietistic movements were char

acteristic of the early part of the century (Roberts 1970:67).
As the assumption that society was a changing entity, not a static
one, gained wider acceptance, the State became stronger than ever before.
New institutions arose:

conscription, police force, centralized admin

istration, and a growing expertise of bureaucracies.

Technical changes

in warfare, transport, and communication further strengthened the State.
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A new class of politicians developed to act as representatives of society
in the bargaining and discussions necessary to the determination of pub
lic affairs.

"The outcome of politics was to be the unquestioned accep

tance of the authority of collective action expressed as the law-making
of the sovereign state" (Roberts 1970:67-8).
Cities grew rapidly in the nineteenth century, particularly capital
cities, creating enormous consumer markets.

Service opportunities be

came abundant as the needs of the city for domestic, retailing, and enter
tainment activities were met.

Industry flourished in'urban environments

providing employment for great numbers and creating unprecedented wealth
for the few entrepreneurs.

An immense chasm between classes of people

came to characterize the social geography of cities.

Segregation of

classes was facilitated by housing, living standards, income, and culture
differences.

"Unhealthiness, overcrowding, ugliness, anarchy given free

rein for the benefit of private interests, and dehumanization through
the lack of social communication" were symptoms of urban problems which
stimulated insurrections, riots, and confrontations (Bedarida, 1970:128).
Anonymity was fostered by large cities.
welfare of the group.

Individual rights preceded the

Cities were, nevertheless, centers of progress

as evidenced in the institution of public services:

road systems with

sidewalks, networks of sewers, water distribution services, organization
of household waste collection, creation of parks and public gardens,
municipal baths and laundries, and improvement of public transport systems
(Bedarida 1970:126-30).
Education had been limited to the elite prior to the Industrial
Revolution.

Developing class consciousness and the need for greater
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knowledge to operate the machines of industry resulted in the institu
tion of public education.

Consequently, primary schools became common

in the nineteenth century (Joll 1970:93).

This development must be ac

knowledged as being of extreme importance to the expansion of the intel
lectual environment.

No longer was knowledge restricted to a few.

In

tellectual communication was facilitated as increasingly more people
became involved.

Public concern for intellectual issues may be seen in

the embracing of evolutionary ideas by the public before honest recog
nition was given to evolution by scientists as evidenced by the public
demand for Chambers' Vestiges (see following discussion, page 58).
Between 1789 and 1900 the total population of Europe increased two
to two and a half times, reaching approximately 400 million.

In addi

tion, during the same period, around 50 million people emigrated to col
onies, especially to the Americas and Australasia.

To meet the demands

for food, industrial farming developed, stimulating a market economy
in which international trade in basic agricultural products and tropical
products grew increasingly important (Thompson 1970:149).
It is arguable that until about 1850 the early stages
of industrialization and urbanization had been made
possible by an increasing surplus of materials, men
and finance extracted from a fundamentally traditional
and technically static agriculture, by means of a tight
ening squeeze on peasants and labourers and at the ex
pense of a deterioration in their living standards,
rather than by an agricultural surplus made available
by technical improvements and increasing productivity
(Thompson 1970:155).
England was an exception to this generalization, in that agricultural
output and prosperity of farmers kept pace with industrialization.

After

1850 the general rural situation improved in response to rapid industrial
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ization and an acceleration of technical changes which raised output and
productivity.

Introduction of railroads extended the market economy into

the countryside.
Demographically, the population shifted from rural to urban concen
trations.

The foremost push-pull factors in this shift are apparent.

Industrialization of agricultural techniques reduced the need for man
power on farms.

Urban industry was creating employment opportunities

as was the growing demand for ’service1-type positions.

Rural popula

tion loss promoted the disruption of traditional peasant communities
and practices.

Conscious efforts were made to preserve these traditions,

resulting in 'old worlde' cults of folk art and costume.
such preservation efforts was the promotion of tourism.

Rationale for
The country

side had become a popular place of escape from urban stresses for the
aristocracy and middle-classes, particularly after the railway made it
more accessible.

The Romantic emphasis on a return to nature further

stimulated rural tourism (Thompson 1970:156-8).
The modern state emerged during the nineteenth century in three
different ways.

The 'Atlantic Revolution' saw the countries from Spain

to Scandinavia unified and consolidated through the reformation and cen
tralization of monarchs and internal revolutions.
cultural and linguistic nations already existed.

In Central Europe,
Here, nation-states

were established through unification and centralization of many small
states into larger wholes under the ideology of 'nationalism.'

Nation

states were formed in Eastern Europe by secession from the larger empire
(R5hl 1970:175).

Looking at the countries under primary consideration

in this paper (England, France, and Germany), one sees two of the three
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modern state development patterns.
the second.

France represents the first, Germany,

England manifested a gradual, peaceful development of a

representative, parliamentary government.
National consciousness, previously associated with allegiance to
a ruling monarch, became more abstract in the nineteenth century— repre
sented symbolically by a flag and an anthem.

Nationalism took different

forms depending on the world view of the particular country, its past
history, and the actual problems of the nation.

In Germany, nationalism

facilitated union by creating the notion of Volk— defined as national
self-consciousness, folk spirit, shared national memories, and poetry
(Mosse 1961:42).

Volk provided an identity factor in a politically weak

and industrially backward country (Mosse 1961:46).
A conservative element characterized English political thought.
The Middle Ages notion of the ruler and the ruled predominated but, per
haps as a consequence of being the focus of the Industrial Revolution
and the concomitant rise of new social classes, a concern for the social
welfare of the people brought social reforms.
In France, the Revolutionary tradition (see above discussion) resulted
in a nationalism concerned less with the distant past, emphasizing a more
intellectual perspective.
A notion of nation superiority was recognizable in both English and
German nationalism.

"For the Germans it was the instinctive soul which

counted; the English were suspicious of intellectual brilliance, but the
Great French Tradition of rationalism asserted itself.

This, in the last

resort, gave a different flavor not only to French nationalism but to
French intellectual endeavor as a whole" as evidenced by giving birth
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to the ideas of both Descartes and Comte (Mosse 1961:62).
Nationalism contributed to imperialism, particularly in France and
England.

Imperialism must be regarded as the end product of several

centuries of an Age of Discovery.

By 1800, approximately 55% of the

world land mass consisted of Europe and its colonies.

Colonization con

tinued in the nineteenth century such that by 1878, 67% of the world
land mass fell into this category and by 1914 the figure reached nearly
85% (Briggs 1970a:36).

Imperialist powers have been described as

states whose material wealth and technical expertise
inevitably gave them control over the rest of the
world; whose political principles were largely ir
relevant outside their own culture (the most liberal
democrat could only be a paternalist abroad); and
whose mutual competition forced them to regard col
onies as sources of power, either economic or stra
tegic (Thornton 1970:216).
The prevalent state of mind characteristic of nineteenth century imper
ialism was a governor/governed dichotomy.

The white establishment had

both the power and conviction that would control and shape the future
world into a Europocentric mold.

'Natives’ were stereotyped into the

'to be ruled' role, being considered not as people but rather as problems,
hence the sense of burden or mission which accompanied imperialism after
1869 (Thornton 1970:230).

To those Europeans who ruled "it seemed pos

sible, practicable, and proper to put the world in order" (Thornton 1970:
232)— a philosophy typical only of the nineteenth century.

The eighteenth

and twentieth centuries recognized and accepted disorder in the world.
Ideologically, the most pervasive influence in nineteenth century
thought, particularly in the first half of the century, was romanticism.
Romanticism developed in opposition to eighteenth century Enlightenment
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rationalism, seeking to "redirect man toward eternal and stable forces
within himself and outside his rational control" (Mosse 1961:9).

Emo

tions and imagination were emphasized as being more valid than reason;
more capable of revealing the ’true’ nature of the world.

The main ele

ments of romanticism have been summarized as
a deep and compelling concern for man's inner life;
a high valuation of emotion and simplicity as against
reason, order, and civilization; a love of nature
amounting often to a sense of mystical communion;
a fascination with the remote and the strange, in
both time and place; and a yearning for the intimate
and the unattainable (Briggs 1970b:292).
In the eighteenth century, Rousseau (1712-1778) foreshadowed roman
ticism by proposing an ideal of 'natural man' who, without civilization
was good and virtuous.

Whether the restoration of the arts and sciences

has contributed to the refinement of morals (1749) was the essay by Rous
seau which has been credited as the starting point of attitude change
(Hampson 1968:187).

Separation of collective interest and individual

interest (society versus its members) was called for with natural feeling
being regarded as an infallible guide to moral action.

'Natural' society

was seen as primitive communism where land was not privately owned and
in which happiness, freedom, and dignity were more likely to occur (Hamp
son 1968:210).

Rousseau, therefore, did not advocate the progressivist

position where society was viewed as developing from simple to complex
with the later stages deemed more perfect than the earlier ones.

Rather,

Rousseau believed society became more unnatural, hence degenerated, as
the social scale was climbed.

In The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality

(1755), Rousseau attributed the Fall, from primal innocence as due to greed
and selfishness.

The few achieved wealth and power at the expense of the
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populous as evidenced by private property and the development of the
state to protect this property (Stromberg 1975:148).

Based on this as

sumption, natural man came to be associated with the rural.

This asso

ciation formed an important preconception of the nineteenth century such
that the peasant was seen to represent the greatest virtues in a contin
ually industrializing society (Mosse 1961:15).
Another significant eighteenth century contributor to romanticism
was Kant (1724-1804).

Of Enlightenment orientation himself, Kant's The

Critique of Pure Reason (1781) stimulated an intellectual movement of
romanticists and idealists in Germany.

His aim was to dislodge the hold

of Humean skepticism and, in consequence, release science from Lockean
empiricism (Stromberg 1975:216).

Kant espoused a view of the mind or

intellect as containing the fundamental conditions of thought which im
posed order on experience.

These ordering principles were present in

all minds, providing a fundamental unity.
While reality was not considered to be a creation of the mind, its
perception was.

Kant recognized two worlds:

the phenomenal, dealing

with knowledge of appearances, the product of a categorizing intellect;
and the noumenal world, the actual external world of reality.
of science was contrasted with the realm of value.
useful knowledge based on the phenomenal world.

The realm

The former contained

The latter was intui

tive, comprised of moral and esthetic experiences founded upon the nou
menal world about which, Kant believed, humanity was likely never to know.
In sum, Kantian philosophy asserted that the human mind was creative,
an active agent, which imposed order on nature, and, by virtue of these
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assertions, that pure empiricism was inadequate scientific method re
quiring creative intuition (Stromberg 1975:217-9).
Both Kant and Rousseau contributed to the new mental climate of the
nineteenth century:

the "individual existed primarily as a morally auton

omous unit whose obligations were self-imposed and owed nothing to the
external authority of a religious creed or the determinist pressure of
a material environment" (Hampson 1968:198).

Industrialization and urban

ization created a general loss of identity by disturbing the more stablizing, strong social structure of pre-industrial society.

Romanticism,

with its emphasis on natural man, was not escapism from the problems
of industrialized society.

Instead, it attempted to solve these problems

by establishing human identity.

Man had to he understood in relation

to the world as a whole with regard to his past.
basic science.

Biology became the

The Cartesian mechanistic world view was objected to and

an organismic model was used in its stead.

In such a model, the parts

were understood only in relation to the whole— the individual in relation
to the world of nature.

The Romantic Age stressed "process, individual

personality, and full realization of that personality through striving
after, and perhaps achieving particular values, goals, and ideals" (Wilshire 1968:23).

The Rise of Evolutionary Theories

While the foundation for the general social sciences was laid in
the eighteenth century, and while certain disciplines diverged late in
that century (notably economics and poiltics), sociology developed after
the work of Comte (Positive Philosophy— 1893) and anthropology secured
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its place among the social sciences with Morgan and Tylor.

Voget assigns

the theory of developmentalism to the period between ca. 1725 and 1890
and then proceeds to divide the period into two phases.

The first phase

covers from 1725 to 1840 and amounts to the progressivist philosophy
discussed previously.

The second phase is delineated between 1840 and

1890, corresponding with the change in the natural sciences from a static
to a dynamic equilibrium model.

When natural science and social science

models of reality assumed the same processes, social scientists could
use interpretations of social development and change (Voget 1975:41-2).
This attitude is in keeping with the thesis of Hallowell, since
thermodynamic theories were necessary to the advancement of geology
which extended the conceptualization of time, a prerequisite to the ac
ceptance of the evolutionary theory of Darwin.

Granted, Darwinian evol

ution was not influential in the ethnological theories of Tylor and Morgan,
but the intellectual atmosphere created by the evolutionary controversy
certainly facilitated the acceptance of an anthropological orientation.
In fact, the Darwinian revolution has been credited with eliminating
man's anthropocentricism (Mayr 1971:1).
Much has been written about the development of the conceptualization
of evolution.

Because better syntheses are available (particularly those

of Glass, Temkin, and Strauss, 1959; Eiseley, 1958; Osborn, 1913). ho
attempt will be made here to reproduce a complete recapitulation.

Only

the most significant influences on intellectual thought favoring and
opposing the changing in time conceptualization will be summarized.
The first foreshadowing of evolutionary theory can be found in the
eighteenth century.

This is not to suggest that there were no evolutionary
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tendencies prior to this period, since the Greeks expressed such notions.
Generally, however, the strictly traditional Judeo-Christian world view
severely circumscribed the intellectual environment as long as the Bib
lical interpretation of the cosmos was accepted as literal fact.

Since

Biblical chronology dated world creation at 4000 years B.C., and since
to disagree with the religious view constituted heresy (at least within
Christianity), intellectuals who discussed origins did so within this
time framework.
Geologists were the first to question Biblical chronology scientif
ically.

The problem in need of explanation was the presence of marine

fossils in inland mountains.

The questioning of such deposits led to

a recognition of the changing nature of the earth which required millions
of years rather than the traditional 6000 year period.
The growth of knowledge about fossil forms of life,
out of which a genealogy of species could be drawn,
and the emergence of an appreciation of the immense
time required by natural processes to fulfill the
history of life indicated by the fossil record, were
among the fundamental developments in the background
of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species (Haber 1959a:3).
Werner (1750-1817)
the

established geology as a recognized science in

eighteenth century. The school of thought he founded has been labeled

Neptunism because of the emphasis placed on the role of water in the for
mation of strata.

The Neptunists contributed to the expanding time depth

of the earth's chronology by extensive fossil identification.

Many geol

ogists were not content to accept only water as the agent of strata change.
These geologists considered heat to be at least an equally important geo
logical agent, hence the labels of Vulcanists and Plutonists were attached
to those adhering to this view (Haber 1959b:242-3).
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Out of this latter school of geological thought, Hutton (1726-1797)
developed ideas which, though radical for his time and, consequently,
ignored by his contemporaries, were particularly influential to the evol
utionary notions of the nineteenth century (Judd 1911:25-32).

His The

ory of the Earth (1788) expressed a timeless world-machine view based
on three principles:

(1) the process of decay— the earth's strata are

the result of the destruction of a succession of former worlds;

(2) the

renovation process— heat repairs the decayed worlds— giving rise to new
ones; and (3) a world is always in existence despite continually under
going the processes of decay and repair (Haber 1959b:244-5).

Uniformi-

tarianism, the theory that "geological phenomena were a product of natural
forces acting over enormous time periods with considerable...uniformity"
(Eiseley 1958:353), was the Huttonian contribution to evolutionary the
ory which was later solidified by Lyell.

Hutton, then, applied evolution

ary ideas to the inorganic world (Judd 1911:17-8).
A prominent influence in creating public awareness of the possibility
of an evolution of earth and organic life through slow processes and
natural forces, was de Maillet's work Telliamed (1748).

Assuming a uni-

formitarian attitude, Telliamed explained fossils as revealing a succes
sion of life forms in the earth's strata.

Despite its fantasy, trasn-

formations, and cosmology, de Maillet's contribution must be acknowledged
as encouraging eventual acceptance of non-orthodox, evolutionary views
by the general public by preparing the proper intellectual environment
(Haber 1959b:230-2; Eiseley 1958:30-5).
The theory of transformism developed as a consequence of Leibniz's
'Great Chain of Being' notion prominent in the eighteenth century.
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(1713-1784) argued in favor of transformism in Pensees sur I 1interpre
tation de la nature (1753).

He presented a view of universe formation

without a separation of organic and inorganic which was an essential
preliminary to the concept of organic evolution (Crocker 1959:119).
Diderot apparently was on the verge of a theory of organic evolution
in that he dealt with time and becoming, the continuity of process, and
the selection of the fit.

"'In general there is no force whatever that

is not a principle of change"1 (Crocker 1959:122).
Buffon's (1707-1788) work both helped and hindered evolutionary
thought.

To begin with, he recognized the problems of natural history:

that it was necessary to reduce the number of separate species to a min
imum; that highly divergent forms derived through a common origin through
natural descent; and that the discovery of the causes and methods of
modification was essential.

Such notions required an expanded time depth.

Buffon used comparative anatomy as evidence of organic evolution and
presented his theories to his contemporaries in a clear and definite
form.

All of these factors strengthened the climate for acceptance of

later evolutionary thought.

But Buffon also promoted a definition of

species in association with an assumption of hybrid sterility which was
a serious deterrent to a theory of descent (Lovejoy 1911:111-3).
The eighteenth century scholar most capable of contributing to evol
utionary thought was Maupertuis (1698-1759).

He has been credited with

having discovered genetic and evolutionary theories comparable to those
of the nineteenth century.
In short, virtually every idea of the Mendelian mech
anism of heredity and the classical Darwinian reason
ing from natural selection and geographic isolation is
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here combined, together with DeVries' theory of muta
tions as the origin of species, in a synthesis of such
genius that it is not surprising that no contemporary
of its author had a true appreciation of it (Glass
1959:60).
As has been mentioned previously, Voltaire so criticized Maupertuis and
his work that his theories were generally ignored even into the nine
teenth and twentieth centuries.

That Darwin makes no mention of Mauper

tuis supports the lack of appreciation of this eighteenth century in
tellectual.
The contributions of Eramus Darwin (1731-1802) (grandfather of Charles)
and Lamarck (1744-1829) might well be regarded as one, since both promoted
transmutation in the same late eighteenth-early nineteenth century period
(Eiseley

1958:46-52). The similarities of the two men's theories have

caused some to accuse Lamarck of plagiarism, since his theory of trans
mutation succeeded the elder Darwin's presentation.

Independent inven

tion, however, is more generally assumed (see Osborn 1913:152-5; also,
Eiseley 1958:49-51).

It is Lamarck, however, who is accorded the position

as foremost of the pre-Darwinian evolutionists (Gillespie 1959:265).

By

way of analogy, it has been stated that Lamarck's philosophy of nature
was to Darwin what Hegel’s historical dialecticism was to Marx (Gillespie
1959:268).
Lamarck's contributions were primarily the establishment of muta
bility of species in descent and the explanation of variations by natural
selection.

In this philosophy, living nature became a plastic force

capable of producing all animals through progressive differentiation
and perfection of organization.

Gaps between life forms were explained

by the influence of the physical environment which channeled of necessity
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the innate tendency toward complication.
Changes in the environment lead to changes in needs;
changes in needs produce changes in behavior; changes
in behavior become new habits which may lead to parti
cular alterations in particular organs and ultimately
in general organization (Gillespie 1959:270).
Following this line of thought led Lamarck to believe that the devel
opment or decay of organs was the result of use or disuse and that organ
isms acquire characteristics through reacting to the environment which
are then inherited.

This notion of the inheritance of acquired charac

teristics may be the weakest point in Lamarck's argument.

Darwin saw

the necessity of distinguishing between the origin of variations (which
occur randomly) and their preservation (according to their effectiveness
in objective circumstances).

Consequently, whereas Lamarckian evolution

proposes endless circles in nature, Darwinian evolution has direction
(Gillespie 1959:287).
One of the leading opponents of evolutionary thought and to Lamarck
in particular was Cuvier (1769-1832).

Both he and Lamarck used compara

tive anatomy to provide evidence for their theories, but the divergence
of their conclusions was complete.

While Lamarck concluded mutability

of species, Cuvier insisted upon fixity.

Regarded as the father of com

parative anatomy and paleontology, Cuvier provided data in support of
evolutionism, particularly his demonstration of divergent anatomical
organization.

This contribution was significant in the breaking down

of the traditional 'Great Chain of Being' notion (Eiseley 1958:88).

Yet,

Cuvier advocated catastrophism rather than uniformity as an explanation
for species change (Osborn 1913:196).
Cuvier subjected Lamarck and his theories to severe criticism.
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influence on the intellectual environment was enhanced by his favored
political position with Napoleon (Osborn 1913:196) and his attempt at
marging the growing discrepancies between Biblical and geological chro
nologies.

Catastrophism explained discontinuities as being the result

of convulsive transformations of the earth's crust.

The latest catas

trophe was considered to have been the Great Deluge, after which the
earth was repopulated.

This notion shifted the emphasis of creation

from earth to man whose antiquity Cuvier never acknowledged (Toulmin and
Goodfield 1965:164-7).
The catastrophist argument was undercut by Lyell (1797-1875) in
1830 with the publication of Principles of Geology.

Advocating uniformi-

tarianism, Lyell synthesized thirty years of geological discovery, recog
nizing only natural processes as agents of change given sufficient time.
As distinguished from Hutton, Lyell down played the provindential char
acter of geological change and, thanks to the increased knowledge of a
later period in time, Lyell provided a more elaborate and detailed ac
count of geological development (Toulmin and Goodfield 1965:167-9).
Lyell effectively broke the time-barrier of Biblical chronology, thereby
paving the way for evolutionary genealogy.
"Once uniformitarianism was accepted, evolutionism became the most
natural and most probable hypothesis concerning the origin of the species"
(Lovejoy 1909:367).

Despite the evolutionary implications of his work,

Lyell did not recognize evolution of organic life.
evolution, supporting instead, special creationists.

He opposed Lamarckian
It was only after

the publication of Origin of Species and the subsequent urging of Huxley
that Lyell supported organic as well as inorganic evolution.

This initial

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

58

stance was significant because of the strength of Lyell1s influence in
scientific circles.

Lyell*s eventual shift to evolutionary doctrines

turned the tide in the intellectual environment.
It has been pointed out that the doctrine of uniformitarianism was
insufficient in itself to introduce progressive biological change.

Uni-

formitarian philosophy implied the Newtonian notion of a self-sustaining
machine operating continually on the same principles.
bution lay in the concept of continuity of action.

Its major contri

Lyell added natural

explanations for extinction, faunal shifts, and so forth to the essen
tially Huttonian stance.
Catastrophism depended upon the supernatural for explanation of
change and was progressive in orientation.

Lyell denied progression and

the intervention of the supernatural, relying on natural causation for
change and retaining a cyclical attitude by leaning toward special creations
(Eiseley 1958:114-5).

As this discussion suggests, Lyell found himself

in an ambiguous position, with data supporting progressive evolution
and a bias toward cyclical creations— a position referred to as non-pro
gression.

It took the work of Darwin to clarify these issues by fusing

progressionism and uniformitarianism.
Thanks primarily to the anonymous work of Chambers (The Vestiges
of the Natural History of Creation— 1844), much of the controversial
nature of evolutionary hypotheses had already been aired and brought
to public awareness by the time of Darwin.

A late nineteenth century

writer said of its role, "'happily the whole subject [evolution] was
brought to such prominence that it could be withdrawn into obscurity
no more

(Draper, 1877, "Evolution:

its Origin, Progress, and Conse-
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quences" as quoted in Eiseley 1958:133-4).

Vestiges appears to have

been founded on a revised progressionism composed of both Lamarckian
and Huttonian elements (Eiseley 1958:137).
was its inability
ution.

The work's major weakness

to present the precise nature of the process of evol

Its fundamental strength was its success with the public.
By 1859, when the Origin of Species was published, an
aroused and eager audience was considerably prepared
for the revelations of Charles Darwin.
The great ama
teur [Chambers] and the great professional scholar
[Darwin] should always be remembered as having together
won the public mind to evolution.
It was one of those
events, beautifully timed by accident, which rarely
occurs in the history of thought (Eiseley 1958:139).

As Darwin himself said about Vestiges:
'The work from its powerful and brilliant style, though
displaying in the earlier editions little accurate know
ledge and a great want of scientific caution, immediately
had a very wide circulation [ten editions in nine years
(Osborn 1913:216)].
In my opinion it has done excel
lent service in this country in calling attention to
the subject, in removing prejudice, and in thus preparing
the ground for the reception of analogous views' (quoted
in Judd 1911:94).
The final influence affecting a suitable intellectual environment
for the acceptance of linear time conceptualization was that of an eigh
teenth century scholar concerned with population dynamics.

Malthus'

Essay on Population (1798) formulated the principle of unchecked popula
tion growth as being geometrical while subsistence increase was arith
metical.

This principle suggested that mortality was necessary for the

survival of the population as a whole (de Beer 1964; in Appleton 1970:
8).

The Malthusian theory convinced Spencer to suggest that 'struggle

for existence' and 'survival of the fittest' were sufficient causes of
progress.

The essay further stimulated both Darwin and Wallace to pro-
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pose natural selection as the primary process of evolution (de Waal
Malefijt 1974:130).
Publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species by Means of Natural
Selection or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life
(more commonly referred to simply as Origin of Species) in 1859 marks
the turning point in the conceptualization of time.

Granted arguments

for and against evolutionary theory existed well before Darwin's pub
lication and persisted well after 1859.

Nevertheless, with Origin of

Species, evolution became a common elementin the intellectual
ment.

environ

Six major elements in the Darwinian revolution of conceptualiza

tion might be summarized here to more succinctly conclude this discus
sion:

(1) the age of the earth was shown to be millions of years old

rather than the 6000 years of Biblical chronology; (2) catastrophism
or progressionism and the concept of a steady-state world were refuted;
(3) the notion of automatic upward evolution or the Great Chain of Being
was refuted; (4) creationism was rejected in favor or natural causation;
(5) essentialism and nominalism were replaced by population thinking;
and finally, (6) anthropocentricism was abolished (Mayr 1971:13-4).
It is clear that with Darwin's Origin of Species, the conceptual
ization of time necessary to Hallowell's thesis was essentially estab
lished.

Having assumed this change in thought, it remains necessary

to discuss the nineteenth century contributions deriving from the Age
of Discovery as they pertain to the emergence of anthropology as a dis
tinct discipline.

It will be shown that this new time conceptualization

as presented by Darwin had an indirect rather than direct influence on
the development of professional anthropology.

Of importance was the
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intellectual atmosphere which gave rise to anthropology and allowed the
acknowledgement of evolutionary theory.

The Professionalization of Anthropology

Having demonstrated the change from a static to a dynamic equili
brium model in the natural sciences, it is necessary to consider the
same transition in the social sciences.

Comte (1798-1857) presented

the ultimate synthesis of progressionism, the first phase discussed pre
viously, in Cours de philosophie positive (1830-42) thus marking the
transition into phase two of developmental thought (Voget 1975:42).
Positivism concerned itself with theoretical systematic inquiry to the
exclusion of the practical.

It dealt with the abstract, general, law-

discovering nature of theory rather than the concrete, descriptive, and
particular.

Since Comte supported the fixity of species, positivism

must be associated with developmentalism or progressionism rather than
evolutionism (Teggart 1962:99-100).
Human progress as proposed by Comte developed through a succession
of knowledge systems.
From a rude fetishistic base, early men synthesized
their explanations of things in theology, then moved
to a rationalization of first principles in a metaphys
ical system, and finally grasped the intellectual
achievement of science, at least in the West (Voget
1975:109).
Essentially, three stages of knowledge were depicted.

First, a theolog

ical or fictive stage occurred in which the activities of personal gods
motivated by human passions explained the universe.

Second, a metaphys

ical or abstract stage developed where personal gods are replaced by
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personified or verbal entities-

In this state, the current activity

of a people corresponded with the abstract concept governing their state
of mind, as for instance individual rights or private property as gods
of industrial society.

Finally, a scientific or positive stage was pre

sented as the most desirable state of knowledge.

At this stage, atten

tion was shifted to a determination of "the succession and inter-rela
tions of facts which give the conditions of human actions"
1965:58-9).

(Penniman

Working at this ideal stage, Comte sought to discover the

natural laws governing human advance which, he assumed, would enable
humanity to control the future without recourse to violence and warfare
(Voget 1975:109).
Society was regarded as the appropriate organizational unit within
which to determine these natural laws.

Consequently, Comte founded a

new science for the study of social phenomena— sociology.

A holistic

approach was envisioned which necessitated a reorganization of the sci
ences regarded as the foundation of sociology— mathematics, astromony,
physics, chemistry, and biology.

The synthetic nature of sociology prompted

Comte to regard it as the master science.
In his theory of social physics, Comte recognized two aspects of
society.

The social anatomy or statics of society was revealed through

a study of organization.

Extant conditions of the individual, family,

and society were analyzed with actions and reactions seen as parts of
the overall system (Teggart 1962:116-7).
Uniform development despite climatic or racial diversities accounted
for the similarities evidenced among societies throughout the world.
concept of psychic unity supported this basic assumption.

The

Embracing the
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comparative method, Comte concluded that all possible stages of human
development were readily observable in contemporary societies.

He as

sumed, therefore, that successive modifications were slow, gradual, and
continuous, invariably following a fixed, determined order and that vari
ation among societies was attributable to the inequality of speed in
passing through successive stages (Teggart 1962:103-4).

Comte’s method

of approach disclosing the dynamic totality of society has been proposed
as his greatest contribution to the social sciences (Penniman 1965:59).
Western societies were the focus of Comte's sociology, an emphasis which
eventually distinguished sociology from anthropology (Voget 1975:111).
Strictly in terms of the history of anthropology, the early nine
teenth century has been labeled the ’dark ages'

(Stocking 1973:xii).

The Age of Discovery, essentially complete at the turn of the century,
had provided a tremendous diversity of physical and cultural data that
required some degree of synthesis and interpretation before anthropology
could emerge as a discipline.

Independently, archaeology, ethnology,

linguistics, and physical anthropology contributed to this synthesis of
data, gradually merging into an integrated discipline.

While some refer

ence will be made to all the subdisciplines, the main concern of this
paper will be with ethnology.
Archaeology not only established itself as a science^ in the early
nineteenth century, but in doing so, it contributed support for the no
tion of progress which influenced Tylor and his contemporaries.

"It

may be said without exaggeration that archaeological evidence is at least
as important as ethnographic evidence for Tylor's conclusions concerning
the overall uniformity of evolutionary change" (Harris 1968:148).
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In 1806 Denmark commissioned the investigation of the geological
and natural history of the country.

A collection from ancient sites

was made and arranged by substance into a stone, copper, iron sequence
by Videl-Simonsen in 1813 (Voget 1975:103).

Christian Thomsen, curator

of the Danish National Museum, used seriational principles to organize
the artifacts into an interanlly consistent developmental sequence con
firming the stone, bronze, and iron sequence already suggested.

Archae

ology was thereby established as an independent science, free from a
dependence on written documents for dating (Trigger 1978:61).

Imperialism

facilitated the collection of antiquities as evidenced by the discovery
of the Rosette Stone made during the Napoleonic conquest of Egypt (Voget
1975:104).
Archaeological discoveries, notably of Boucher de Perthes in 1838
and 1846, were generally disregarded in the early nineteenth century due
primarily to the authority of Buckland, a believer in the theory of a
universal deluge.

Despite finds of artifacts and human bones in associ

ation with extinct animals, the learned world laughed at any theory which
suggested bones and objects were 'older than the world itself’ (Penniman
1965:53-4).

Even the Neanderthal discoveries (1857) were viewed as repre

sentative of a primitive race.

Not until 1858, when a team of British

scientists composed of Falconer, Prestwich, Evans, and Lyell examined
and concurred with de Perthes' Abbeville evidence, was recognition of
the antiquity of man established (Lowie 1937:8).
Three ideological trends can be discerned in early nineteenth century
thought:
view;

(1) an increasing dissatisfaction with the Biblical creationist

(2) a return to eighteenth century progressionism; and (3) an in-
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tensification of racial arrogance.

Of these trends, only the third rep

resents a phenomenon peculiar to the nineteenth century.

During the

Enlightenment, European superiority was generally unquestioned.

Race

was associated with culture and environmental determinism was called
upon to explain human diversity.

After the French Revolution, humanity

became involved in a struggle to eliminate inferior and to elevate su
perior nations and races (Harris 1968:94-8).

"[T]he professionalization

of anthropology as a discipline coincided with and was intimately asso
ciated with, the rise of raciology" (Harris, 1968:100).
Nineteenth century racism was regarded as an explanation for human
diversity being supported by an idea of progress where civilization was
viewed Europocentrically.

Racism was also used as a justification for

imperialism, as an explanation for the problems of the industrial age,
and gave support to national self-consciousness (Mosse 1961:74).

Lin

guistic, cultural, and anatomical data were used to establish racial con
clusions (Voget 1975:106).
Classification of humans in the late eighteenth, early nineteenth
centuries reflected this overriding concern for racial placement of new
peoples (Shapiro 1964:345).

Anthropometric work of men such as Gall

(1758-1828), The Anatomy and Psychology of the Nervous System in General
and the Skull in Particular with Observations How Moral and Intellectual
Predispositions of Men and Animals Can Be Recognized through the Conf igurations of Their Heads (1810-19), was characteristic of the period.
Racism was...an emotional presupposition which, through
seeking scientific foundations, adhered to what it con
sidered to be anthropological truth, regardless of sci
entific advance (Mosse 1961:75).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

66

Prichard (1786-1848) was the foremost ethnologist exemplifying the
general Romantic concern with nationalism and racial origins.

He pro

posed that "as variation was stimulated in plants by cultivation and in
animals by domestication, in man it was stimulated by civilization [i.e.,
culture]" thereby, rejecting the traditional notion of climate as the
mechanism for differentiation of race.

The primitive stock of humans

was seen to be Negroes with skin color progressing from black to white.
Prichard suggested that the processes of going from black skin to white
skin and from savagery to civilization were causally interrelated (Stoc
king 1973:liii-lv).
It is apparent that Prichard’s contribution to modern anthropology
was not theoretical.

Rather, it was his definition of a particular tra

dition of British anthropological inquiry which influenced Tylor and
others of the nineteenth century.

Researches into the Physical History

of Man (1836-47) and The Natural History of Man (1843) provided a col
lection of all that was then known about the various races of man— "a
synthesis of anatomical, philological, psychological, and ethnological
data, [which] form the foundation of ethnology in England" (Penniman
1965:64).

A summary of the five categories of references in Researches,

therefore, represents the position of anthropological thought at the time.
The largest group of references consisted of classical writers, particu
larly historian-geographers like Herodotus and Strabo, who contributed
data on culture and physical types from within the boundaries of the
classical world.

Next came travel writers from late eighteenth century

scientific expeditions who, despite a characteristic botanical orientation,
provided a sizable collection of ethnographic data and material on human
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variety.

The third category was biological sciences writings coming

from three sources:

a local observational tradition, widely travelled

natural historians who wrote systematic zoological treatises, and the
newer comparative anatomy tradition typified by Blumenbach which laid
the foundation for physical anthropology.

A fourth source came from the

tradition of oriental studies associated with Jones which had previously
been recognized only in linguistics.

Finally, historical references

were included as chronological sources of racial genealogy of the Chris
tian tradition prevalent at the time (Stocking 1973:xxxiv-xl).
Ethnology, as presented by the Edinburgh Review in 1848, was regarded
as the science of races.

Ethnological societies were formed in Paris,

London, and New York in 1839, 1841, and 1842 respectively (Voget 1975:
108).

These organizations were preoccupied with racial issues and should

not be confused with the anthropological societies of the last half of
the century (see below).

The intellectual climate of the early nineteenth

century was not favorable to understanding the alien and primitive.

The

arrogance of imperial conquest, the missionary ardour of Evangelical
Christianity, the slavery controversy, and the narrowness of utilitarian
ism and political economy theories produced an atmosphere of dogmatism.
Primitive behavior was not regarded as being of legitimate human and
scientific interest (Burrow 1970:77).
Serious study of the manners, customs, institutions, and beliefs
of primitive and oriental peoples was revived in the 1860s.

Evidence

of this renaissance out of the 'dark ages' of the early nineteenth cen
tury may be found in the works on Maine, Ancient Law (1861); Lubbock,
Prehistoric Times (1865); McLennan, Primitive Marriage (1865); and Tylor,
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Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of Civil
ization (1865) and Primitive Culture (1871) (Burrow 1970:80-1).

Direct

observation and a changing intellectual climate contributed to the study
of primitive societies as working systems.
Evolutionary social theory arose, not only from a
desire to emulate in the study of society the achieve
ments of biology, geology, and philology, but as a
reaction against the collapse of systematic utili
tarianism and the weakening of traditional religious
belief (Burrow 1970:97)
characteristic of the early nineteenth century.
Universality of natural causation was a fundamental principle in
evolutionary social theories.

The apparent differences among peoples

could be accommodated because they represented different stages in the
same process.

The process was then described as progress, allowing the

formulation of moral and political theories.

Archaeological evidence

accepted in the 1850s and 1860s supported the assignment of different
stages of the same basic process to explain cultural differences among
contemporary societies by suggesting that the ancestors of civilized
man were as primitive as contemporary savages.

It became the role of

anthropology to search for the laws of this assumed uniform development
of culture, an effort which has been construed as premature (Boas 1904:
516).

Nevertheless, the resultant unilineal evolutionary theory estab

lished anthropology as a recognized discipline.
Emphasis of these pre-professional anthropologists tended to fall
into one of three categories:

those regarding the evolution of specific

institutions, scientists or archaeologists interested in anatomy, bio
logy, or geology, and those working with Spencerian social structures
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and functions (Burrow 1970:235).

The list of individuals contributing

to the developing anthropological framework at this stage is lengthy
and includes Maine, McLennan, Lubbock, Waitz, Bastian, Bachofen, Klemm,
Retzius, von Humboldt, and Lartet.
"Anthropological societies developed in response to the need to
study the origins and development of man as a biological species and
to extend the science of ethnology beyond racial history, character, and
customs" (Voget 1975:133).

Within twenty years, from 1859 to 1879, so

cieties were founded in Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, Stockholm, and
Washington.

Anthropology became an integrating discipline with ethnology,

linguistics, archaeology, and physical anthropology uniting to form a
new science of man.
Three major influences distinguish professional anthropology from
the stage discussed above.

Foremost of these was E. B. Tylor (1832-1917)

who rigorously adopted a unilineal evolutionary approach and defined the
science of culture.

His "insight that culture was learned rather than

inborn and socially determined rather than racially" remains fundamental
in modern anthropological thought (de Waal Malefijt 1974:159).

Perhaps

most important to this thesis is the fact that Tylor won academic recog
nition for anthropology when he was awarded a Readership at Oxford Uni
versity in 1884 and the Chair in 1896 (Burrow 1970:235); de Waal Malefijt
1974:145; Penniman 1965:141).

From this point anthropology may be regarded

as professionalized.
The remaining two influences in the professionalization process
which warrant mention are provided by Morgan (1818-1881) and Frazer (18541941).

The former directed anthropologists to the importance of fieldwork
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and first hand observation and data collection.

Morgan also established

the value of kinship and its interrelationships with other cultural in
stitutions.

Popularization of anthropology had been credited to Frazer

whose books presented the worth of studying humanity in an interesting
manner (de Waal Malefijt 1974:159).

Whatever the flaws in the theories

of Tylor, Morgan, and Frazer, their contribution to recognition of a new
science of humanity as anthropology remains significant.
It has been the intent of this thesis
intellectual environment which contributed
anthropology.

to develop the history of the
to professionalization of

By definition, professionalization coincides with academic

recognition, therefore, this thesis has reached its logical conclusion.
One must be aware, however,

that professionalization is a process which

for anthropology only began at this point.

Many more individuals have

been involved in this process and considerable discussion has been ac
corded these people elsewhere (Voget 1975; Harris 1968; Garbarino 1977).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING STATEMENTS

[T]he events and conditions which led up to the per
iod when anthropological questions became the concern
of specialists and organized disciplines, require
exploration as an anthropological problem— as a sig
nificant chapter in m a n ’s pursuit of knowledge about
himself as part of his cultural adaptation (Hallowell
1965:316).
This thesis has undertaken an investigation into these events and con
ditions in an effort to shed greater light on the professionalization
of anthropology, hence increasing our understanding of ourselves as pro
fessionals.

Since this unveiling has necessarily been lengthy, a recapit

ulation may be in order.
Our concern has been with the change in perception concomitant with
the transition from an interest in humanity to the objective, systematic
study of humanity by specialists.

Answers to anthropological questions

provided by a culture's traditional knowledge, "i.e., a body of obser
vations, beliefs, and socially sanctioned dogmas which parallel folk
knowledge about other aspects of the phenomenal world" was defined as
folk anthropology (Hallowell 1965:306).

The transition from folk to pro

fessional anthropology began with events in the Renaissance and concluded
with academic recognition of anthropology by Oxford University in the late
nineteenth century.
Initially, then, folk anthropology may be correlated with the tra
ditional world view of the Middle Ages.

The medieval world view was

dominated and circumscribed by the Church.

Supernatural causation served

as the explanation for unknowns and uncertainties.

Legitimation was

sought in the sacred which could not be disproved and required recourse
71
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to faith (see Rappaport 1971a, 1971b).

The replacement of supernatural

explanations for the origin of man and his universe with natural explan
ations necessitated a change in legitimating factors from sacred to sec
ular, from theological to scientific, from fictive to empirical.

The

nature of this transition through time from the Middle Ages philosophy
to that of the late nineteenth century, when anthropology was distinguished
as a social science in its own right, has been presented.
Two particular discoveries of the Renaissance contributed signifi
cantly to the dislodging of traditional world view.

On the popular level,

the Renaissance was characterized by the rise of capitalism.

The creative

genius of the successful entrepreneur was rewarded with increased wealth
and prestige.

Merchants and craftsmen were the first to benefit substan

tially from capitalism; but, anthropology also gained from the entrepre
neurs’ greed.

Continually seeking faster, more reliable trade routes,

daring monarchs and merchants invested in maritime operations, the way
having been paved by Prince Henry, Columbus, Magellan, and others.

In

addition to wealth in resources, however, the voyages and expeditions
revealed a greatly expanded geographical world with tremendous cultural
and biological diversity.

How scholars have attempted to explain this

unexpected and overwhelming diversity is a necessary question since the
data forced a re-evaluation of the traditional world view.

Renaissance

interest in native populations was directly proportional to the degree
of exploitation intended by the Europeans.

Morality was not a factor

since natives were seen as being scarcely human.

As time progressed im

perialistic attitudes with racial justifications developed and were even
tually modified by a sense of missionizing or burden.

In each situation,
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capitalistic considerations took precedence.
At an intellectual level, one sees a preoccupation of scholars with
origins.

This reflects a concern for self-understanding.

The search

for origins resulted in an identification with ancient Greek and Roman
civilizations and the incorporation of Classical ideas into Renaissance
world view.

Turning to Classical scholars for inspiration marked the

first major weakening of the hold of the Church.

Increasing seculari

zation was accompanied by development of a humansitic attitude.

The

discovery of human history and its pursuit was a prerequisite to formu
lating a science of humanity.
Hallowell (1965:308-9) specified the development of a firm spatiotemporal framework as a necessary condition for professionalization.
As this discussion has demonstrated, the initial changes in these con
ceptualizations occurred in the Renaissance, with a recognition of his
tory and increased geographical awareness due to maritime exploration.
Despite these early stages of conceptualization change, the pre
vailing Renaissance system of knowledge must be regarded as theological
or fictive (to place this discussion in Comtean terms).

Ideologically,

the authorities directing attitudes were theologians and the overall
intellectual atmosphere had a fundamentally sacred air.

Renaissance

scholars expanded tremendously the pool of data in need of incorporation
by the human mind.

It took centuries to weaken effectively the hold

of the traditional Christian world view and to develop an acceptable
alternative world view based on this new information which would permit
or even encourage the serious and complete study of humanity.
When seventeenth century astronomers became aware of the heliocentric
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nature of the universe discrediting the traditional terracentric world
view, scholars began to seriously question the supernatural tenets as
sumed by the Church.

The contributions of two philosopher-scientists,

Bacon and Descartes, set Western civilization on an irreversible course
toward the establishment of a new system of knowledge.

The former empha

sized inductive reasoning and empirical methods, thus stimulating the
search for general laws via hypothesis construction and testing.

Des

cartes stressed deductive reasoning and mathematics, proposing a mechan
istic world view based on a perfectly ordered, unified, and interlocking
universal science.

Humanity was separated from nature by virtue of an

ability to reason.

In general, explanation shifted from a supernatural

realm to a natural one.

Serious decline in the authority of the Church

accompanied this shift as increasingly science was inclined toward for
legitimation.

Dissention within the Church furthered the deterioration

of sacred authority.
Interest in humanity has been established as primary in Renaissance
thought.

Recognition of the potential for scientific methodologies in

understanding humanity led to their application to social phenomena in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
exceeded and bona fide study had begun.
development of anthropology was achieved.

Mere interest had now been
Thus the second stage in the
The appeal to reason as an

explanation of human distinctness suggests the reliance upon metaphysical
notions.

Theologians no longer exclusively dominated the intellectual

environment.

Rather, philosophers stimulated the patterns of knowledge

influencing the period.
With the growing awareness of human diversity, more and more effort
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was expended in explanation attempts.

In the eighteenth century the

public world view still accepted Christian order, but the intellectuals
generally questioned this tradition in favor of Cartesian natural order.
Humans, separated from nature by virtue of reason and society, hence
unified psychologically as a species, were assumed to have become diverse
as a consequence of differential experiential or environmental exposure
based on the Lockean tabula rasa notion.
Progress from simplicity to complexity was an assumed universal
law of nature.

Application of this principle to social phenomena became

the focus of the eighteenth century social philosophers, resulting in
several proposed theories of development.

Despite the tendency toward

developmentalism, the eighteenth century world view remained static,
based upon creation of species, immutable over time.

By the end of the

century, the entire geographic world had been mapped, a cosmopolitan
atmosphere characterized the European intellectual climate, and gener
alized social sciences had been established.

The study of humanity was

well underway, although the specific concerns of anthropology were yet
to be formulated.
Late eighteenth century events significantly altered the intellec
tual environment which followed.

The French Revolution (1789) contri

buted a philosophy of liberty, human dignity, and the rights of man.
It created a new social class— the bourgeoisie— and abolished serfdom.
Evangelical and pietistic movements arose in reaction to the Revolution,
furnishing a strong conservative element in the otherwise liberating
environment.
In England, the Industrial Revolution produced a philosophy of
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political economy based on the theory of laissez-faire.

Individualism,

a market system based on competition, and materialism were promoted.
Social change was evidenced in urbanization as population concentrations
shifted from the countryside to towns and a new class structure devel
oped.

To facilitate operation of industrial machinery, public education

commenced.

The ramifications of this event alone would have a tremendous

impact on the intellectual environment which had previously been restric
ted to an elite few.

Given the combination of factors of change already

discussed, it is not surprising that a major conceptualization change
should have occurred within such a transitional environment.
Romanticism, a nineteenth century ideology expressing opposition
to Enlightenment rationalism, was the most pervasive influence in the
century.

Founded on the doctrines of Rousseau and Kant, romanticism

stressed the inner qualities of humanity, the emotional or mystical.
Rather than abstracting humans from nature by virtue of reason, roman
tics placed humanity solidly within nature.

This was a necessary con

dition for the acceptance of evolutionary theories as they pertain to
organic life, particularly human.
Until the mid-nineteenth century a static world view had been main
tained in Western civilization.

Geologists and comparative anatomists

had revealed that structural change occurred through gradual and uniform
natural processes requiring a greatly expanded time depth.

The work of

Darwin provided the mechanism by which such evolution could take place
as well as substantial data supporting the contention that evolution
had and still was taking place.
theory.

Darwin did not formulate evolutionary

He merely provided the evidence which made it believable and
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acceptable to the scientific world which had been dabbling with evolu
tionary notions for some time.

Chambers had made evolution known to the

popular community earlier, significantly influencing the mid-century
intellectual environment.

Recognition of inorganic and organic change

was fundamental to the shift from a static to a dynamic world view.
That the dynamic equilibrium model adopted, i.e., evolution, was favor
able to the professionalization of anthropology is easily demonstrated
by its seeming support of and adoption by social evolutionists and early
nineteenth century ethnographers, the two groups influencing early an
thropologists .
The same intellectual climate in which evolutionary theory developed,
saw the divergence of the social sciences.

Comte figured prominently in

this process by presenting sociology as a holistic social science.

So

ciety as a system should be studied in terms of its organization (social
statics) as well as its progress through time (social dynamics).

Comte’s

ideas were advanced by Spencer who more fully detailed a social evolu
tionary theory.

The influence of Comte and Spencer on the intellectual

environment must be admitted to have encouraged the eventual acceptance
of anthropology.
A quarter of a century after the publication of Darwin's Origin
of Species, anthropology was acknowledged as a distinct discipline worthy
of advanced study.

It developed most directly out of the interest in

ethnology evidenced in the early nineteenth century.

The racial ideology

based on the notion of European supremacy which dominated the nineteenth
century contributed substantially to the ethnographic data base.

Through

the manipulation of these data, scholars presented literature in support
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of racial notions.

Consequently, the value of seriously studying non-

Western populations was realized albeit for ethnocentric reasons.

That

ethnology was referred to as the science of races, that its proponents
assumed the doctrine of progressionism, and that Tylor was a product
of this line of reasoning reflects the direct relationship between nine
teenth century racial ideology, unilineal evolutionary theory, and pro
fessional anthropology.

Since racial ideology arose as an explanation

for cultural diversity, it may be suggested that the trend to explain
human diversity revealed as a consequence of the Age of Discovery moved
from purely fictive, monstrosity-oriented explanations through environ
mental determinism, to racial determinism.
These latter two explanations, while consciously attempting to
achieve scientific status, must be categorized as at a metaphysical stage.
The reason for this opinion is that ethnology still was concerned with
demonstrating the abstract assumptions of progress and racial superiority.
Comparative methodology was generally not used relativistically and the
value of first hand observation was yet to be realized.

Only after pro

fessionalization does anthropology begin to approach a scientific system
of empirical knowledge.

Whether or not such a level, in fact, has been

achieved is a question which is still debated.
Modern anthropological explanations developed well after the dis
cipline professionalized in 1884.

The ’dark ages' connotation given

this pre-professional period by Stocking is interesting in this light.
The period may be regarded as a black box.
a confused, generalized social science.

Entering this black box is

Emerging from it is anthropology

as a professional discipline— far from mature but, at least, distinct.
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FOOTNOTES

1-

Shapiro (1964:338) commits four centuries to the age suggesting that
by the mid-nineteenth century, virtually all the geographic world
was known to Western civilization. This correlates nicely with the
requirements set by Hallowell for the professionalization of anthro
pology. The impact of increasing geographical awareness on this
process will be demonstrated by tracing its development through the
history and culture of the four centuries and through an explication
of its effects on ideology.

2.

Ruybroeck's name is spelled variously, depending on the reference.

3.

The English translation appearing in 1555 was titled: The fardie
of factions, conteining the aunciente maners, customs, and lawes,
of the peoples enhabiting the two partes of the earth, called Affrika and Asie (Hodgen 1964:133).

4.

The European concept of savage innocence is founded on another in
teresting premise. Jones brings the association between nakedness
and innocence to our attention.
"It has been remarked that because
Europeans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were heavily
clothed and made much of the ritual of costuming, nakedness struck
them the more forcibly.
It is also true that nakedness is part of
the iconography of innocence in medieval and Renaissance art" (Jones
1964:16-7).
The fact that New World inhabitants were unaware (by
European standards) of religion, law, clothing, books, money, and
so forth contributed to a notion of a Golden Age of innocence.

5.

Theist has been substituted for deist but, judging from the synop
sis, natural religion is being discussed by Voltaire.

6.

Harris contradicts this by stating, "it would be rather pointless
to refute the determinism Montesquieu attributes to geographical
factors" (1968:42). Several other sources emphasize the functionalist
tendencies of Montesquieu representing the position taken in this
paper.

7.

Whether or not archaeology may be regarded as a science is a contraversial issue which goes beyond the scope of this paper. For a dis
cussion of this issue the reader is referred to Spaulding (1968:33-9).
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